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1  WAR: CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS 
 
1.1  Introduction 
 
Even casual inspection of the literature reveals the following, incomplete, list of ‘war’ terms: 
limited war and total (or all-out) war, cold war and hot war, local war and world war, 
controlled and uncontrolled war, accidental war and premeditated war, conventional and 
nuclear war, declared and undeclared war, aggressive or offensive war and defensive war, 
general war and proxy war, international war and civil war, tribal and civilized war, 
preventive or pre-emptive war, protracted war, absolute war, war of liberation, war of 
conquest, war of commerce, war of plunder, revolutionary war, political war, economic war, 
social war, imperialist war, guerilla war, psychological war, strategic war, counter-insurgency 
war, dynastic war, monarchical war, ritual war, agonistic war, sacred war, instrumental war, 
genocidal war. 
Much of the complexity stems from the fact that the epithets refer to different aspects of, and 
perspectives on, war: e.g. war as condition, techniques of warfare, alleged motives and/or 
objectives of war, or assumptions about belligerent behavior and the causes (causative factors, 
determinants, conditions, etc. ) of war (cf. Grieves 1977). War is a species in the genus of 
violence; more specifically it is collective, direct, manifest, personal, intentional, organized, 
institutionalized, instrumental, sanctioned, and sometimes ritualized and regulated, violence. 
These distinguishing features and dimensional delineations are not limitative. It should be 
perfectly clear, however, that war, or the state of belligerence, is a very special category of 
violence (van der Dennen, 1977). 
Some of the listed war terms reflect concern for attitudes and behaviour, linked with 
assumptions about the cause of war. The term ‘imperialist war’ reflects both an attitude about 
the root causes of the war and an assumption about which States are guilty of having caused 
it. Also, much of the ‘nature of war’ is found not on the battlefield, but in the hostile 
behaviour and attitudes that characterize a state’s foreign policy. Q. Wright (1942; 1965) calls 
attention to the discussion of this psychological aspect of war in Hobbes’ ‘Leviathan’, where 
the oscillations of war and peace are compared to the weather: 
 
As the nature of foul weather lieth not in a shower or two of rain, but in an inclination 
thereto of many days together; so the nature of war consisteth not in actual fighting, but in 
the known disposition thereto during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. 
(Hobbes, 1651) 
 
Hobbes’ view raises an interesting question for modern students. Can peace be defined simply 
as the absence of war (using ‘war’ in the sense of actual military combat) (Grieves, 1977)? 
 
 
1.2  Formal and material distinction of peace and war 
 
The important point is that peace and war as facts differ formally rather than materially, 
and are distinguishable by their locus and implements rather than by their intrinsic qualities as human behavior. Peace, it would appear, is the aggregation of chronic, diffuse, 
unorganized domestic conflicts: war is conflict, acute, organized, unified and concentrated 
at the peripheries of a society’s habitat. (Kallen, 1939) 
 
War and peace differ not in the goals pursued, only in the means used to attain them. 
(Barbera, 1973) 
 
Clausewitz’s formula - war is the continuation of policy by other means - has been 
replaced by its opposite: policy is the continuation of war by other means. But these two 
formulas are, formally, equivalent. They both express the continuity of competition and the 
use of alternately violent and non-violent means towards ends which do not differ in 
essence. (Aron, 1966) 
 
... the nature of war itself has changed. In particular there is no longer a dividing line 
between a state of peace and a state of war. (Eccles, 1965) 
 
Behind both phenomena, war and peace, lies the same dimension of power. (Barbera, 
1973) 
 
Many political realists point out that the common basis of policy in both peace and war, 
namely the quest for power, makes them two inseparable parts of the same social activity. 
Blainey (1973) contends that the causes of war and peace dovetail into one another: “War 
and peace are not separate compartments. Peace depends on threats and force; often peace 
is the crystallization of past force.” Or formulated most succinctly: “In a system of power 
politics, there is no difference in kind between peace and war”. (Schwartzenberger, 1950) 
 
War is a means of achieving an end, a weapon which can be used for good or for bad 
purposes. Some of these purposes for which war has been used have been accepted by 
humanity as worthwhile ends: indeed, war performs functions which are essential in any 
human society. It has been used to settle disputes, to uphold rights, to remedy wrongs: and 
these are surely functions which must be served... One may say, without exaggeration, that 
no more stupid, brutal, wasteful or unfair method could ever have been imagined for such 
purposes, but this does not alter the situation. (Eagleton, 1948) 
 
These formulations are reminiscent of Ambrose Bierce’s sardonic definition of “peace” as: “a 
period of cheating between two periods of fighting” (Devil’s Dictionary), or Orwell’s famous 
dictum from 1984: “Peace is War”. 
 
Diametrically opposed to the vista of peace and war as a bipolar continuum is the view of a 
sharp and clear-cut borderline existing between the two conditions, thus implying a 
boundary-transgression in the transition from one state of affairs to the other. Brodie (1973), 
for example, states: 
 
Although war represents human violence in its most intensive form, it is not simply human 
violence. It is something else besides, something with a distinctive and quite special 
configuration. The characteristics of this configuration cover a wide variety of phenomena, 
including the following: First, wars have tended, since antiquity, to have a clear and sharp 
beginning and an equally clear and sharp ending; and various ceremonials have been 
involved both in the initiation and the termination of war. 
 The most outspoken advocate, perhaps, of this view is Wells (1967), who succinctly affirms: 
“Notions of some limbo between war and peace are either contradictory or unintelligible”. 
Or, as it was stated in classical times: “Inter bellum et pacem nihil medium”. 
 
1.3  The socio-political definition of war 
 
According to international law, war, in principle, can only take place between sovereign 
political entities, that is, States. War is thus a means for resolving differences between units of 
the highest order of political organization. The majority of those who have been concerned 
with war as a socio-political phenomenon have also adopted as their basic premise that there 
is a fundamental difference between domestic conflicts, for which there are normally 
mechanisms for peaceful resolution, and international conflicts, which occur in a state of 
anarchy. Wars have been seen to involve directly State institutions, such as the foreign office 
and the armed forces. Since war is put in an international context, the stakes of war may be 
the life and death of States (Aron, 1966). 
 
This general outlook on war as an international or inter-State phenomenon has been shared by 
many students, regardless of their professional background as political scientists, historians, 
sociologists, psychologists or military analysts. The school of political realism maintains that 
nation-States can only realize their national interests by demonstrating their willingness to 
fight and by making use of wars of various degrees of magnitude as an instrument of national 
policy to achieve legitimate ends (Lider, 1977; Nobel, 1977). 
 
Von Clausewitz (1911) defined war as “an act of violence intended to compel our opponents 
to fulfil our will”, and elsewhere he emphasized the continuity of violence with other political 
methods: “War is nothing but a continuation of political intercourse, with a mixture of other 
means.” 
 
Sorel (1912) defined war as a “political act by means of which States, unable to adjust a 
dispute regarding their obligations, rights or interests, resort to armed force to decide which is 
the stronger and may therefore impose its will on the other”. 
 
Kallen (1939) seems to favour a political definition of war when he writes: “If war may be 
defined as an armed contest between two or more sovereign institutions employing organized 
military forces in the pursuit of specific ends, the significant term in the definition is `organ-
ized’.” He further adds that this organization of the contending armed forces extends back 
behind the battle lines and tends in modern wars to embrace all civilian activities, such as the 
industrial, productive, and commercial, and also the social interests and individual attitudes. 
 
Kallen (1939) criticizes von Clausewitz’ (1911) definition of war as “an act of violence for 
the purpose of compelling the enemy to do what we will” as too general and indefinite. He 
says that “this definition might apply also to much that is called peace, particularly in sport, 
business and finance. It might apply to anybody’s act of violence, whenever it occurs. As 
limited to war, it applies to pre-Napoleonic and pre-industrial times and intentions, when war 
was a castle enterprise, and a gentleman’s game”. 
 
A. Johnson (1935) defines war as “armed conflict between population groups conceived of as 
organic unities, such as races or tribes, states or lesser geographic units, religious or political 
parties, economic classes”. This definition may, according to Bernard (1944), be regarded as 
approximately sociological because it does not limit the armed conflict to political units but includes any type of population units which is capable of resorting to arms as a method of 
settling disputes. Perhaps the definition is too general, since it does not specify the duration of 
the conflict or the magnitude of the conflicting parties. As it stands this definition could be 
made to include riots. 
 
B. Russell’s ( 1916) definition of war as “conflict between two groups, each of which 
attempts to kill and maim as many as possible of the other group in order to achieve some 
object which it desires” is even more general and uncritically inclusive. Russell states the 
object for which men fight as “generally power or wealth”. 
 
Wallace (1968) considers war to be “the sanctioned use of lethal weapons by members of one 
society against members of another. It is carried out by trained persons working in teams that 
are directed by a separate policy-making group and supported in various ways by the 
non-combatant population”. 
 
Ashworth (1968): “Mass or total war may be defined as a type of armed conflict between 
large nation-States in which populations and resources are rationally and extensively 
organized for conquest. It is important to note that populations are mobilized both in terms of 
activities and psychological states: the former implies comprehensive military and civilian 
conscription; the latter implies the systematic development of belligerent and hostile attitudes 
towards the enemy among all or most of the population.” 
 
Deutsch and Senghaas (1971): “By ‘war’ we mean actual large-scale organized violence, 
prepared and maintained by the compulsion and legitimacy claims of a State and its 
government, and directed against another State or quasi-State, i.e. a relatively comparable 
political organization”. 
 
Barringer (1972) considers war to be “one possible mode of policy activity aimed at 
effectively and favourably resolving an ongoing conflict of interests. In this sense war is but 
one of numerous conflict procedures, others being negotiation, conciliation, mediation, 
arbitration, and adjudication. It is merely a particular subset of the larger set of all conflict 
modes, encompassing all the socially (if not legally) recognized situations in which armed 
hostilities of considerable magnitude are conducted on a systematic and continuing basis by 
the armed forces of two or more political factions, organizations, nations, governments, or 
States. Because the term ‘war’ carries legal implications and connotations that no political 
body cares any longer to suffer or risk publicly, the de facto situation of war will be referred 
to as `hostilities’. 
 
Bernard (1944) attempts an all-purpose definition of war which is neither so general that it is 
indefinite and vague nor so detailed that it is confusing. It may be stated as follows: “War is 
organized continuous conflict of a transient character between or among collectivities of any 
sort capable of arming and organizing themselves for violent struggle carried on by armies in 
the field (or naval units on water) and supported by civil or incompletely militarized 
populations back of the battle areas constituted for the pursuit of some fairly well-defined 
public or quasipublic objective.” 
 
This objective is of course not always defined to the satisfaction of all concerned and it is 
liable to change according to circumstances during the continuance of the struggle. But upon 
the popular understanding of these objectives depends in large measure the degree and loyalty 
of the people’s support. While the war is between or among organized groups or collectivities, the fact of organization implies leadership (generals, military staffs, civilian 
economic, political and moral organizers and leaders) and collective effort, both military and 
civilian. The need for discipline and coordination also implies obvious regimentation within 
the army and of the belligerent populations as wholes, as well as more subtle manipulation of 
the psychological and social factors contributing to both military and civilian morale 
(Bernard, 1944). 
 
Beer (1974) presents a minimum definition of war as “the presence of direct international 
violence”. 
 
Crew (1952) defines war “as organized, intraspecific conflict, in which force, coercion is 
displayed”. 
 
Similar concise “political” definitions are presented by White (1949), Malinowski (1936; 
1941), Mead (1964), Bouthoul (1959; 1962), Sokol (1961), Nieburg (1963), Valkenburgh 
(1964), Withey and Katz (1965), Plano and Olton (1969), van Doorn and Hendrix (1970), 
Czempiel (1971), Krippendorff (1971), Zsifkovits (1973), Barbera (1973), Harrison (1973), 
Van den Berghe (1978), The Encyclopaedia Brittanica, Oxford Dictionary, etc. 
 
Bozeman (1976) has argued that the term “international war” no longer refers exclusively to 
violent conflicts between States. Rather, he says, 
 
It now stands also for a broad spectrum of armed belligerence within the State, ranging 
from sporadic urban guerilla activities to civil wars, wars of liberation and secession, 
insurrections and other revolutionary uprisings, many of which are initiated and 
maintained in behalf of causes espoused by foreign principals. Moreover, this 
interpenetration of the domestic and foreign environments effaces altogether the 
conventionally accepted lines between legitimate and illegitimate force, and puts in 
question the theoretically established distinctions between war and peace. These 
interlocking conditions support the conclusion that the State, having forfeited important 
controlling functions customarily ascribed to it in world affairs, can no longer be regarded 
as a reliable medium for realistic differentiation among types of war and between the 
conditions of war and peace. 
Next, the erosion of the State as the fundamental, shared norm of political organization, 
together with general acquiescence in the coexistence of States and anti-State bodies as 
equal actors in foreign policy arenas, has gradually but ineluctably led also to the 
devaluation of the two State-based superstructures that provide the context for official 
foreign relations: (1) the world society of sovereign, equal States and (2) the law of 
nations, which stipulates the rights and obligations of these States. 
 
Bozeman proposes civilization as an alternative: 
 
Today, several factors combine in support of civilization as the proper focal point of war 
research. As preceding comments on the variegated forms of war and violence throughout 
the modern world have suggested, the Occidental model of the State has ceased to be a 
reliable indicator or measure of such phenomena as international war and internal war. 
Indeed, a survey of actually functioning power centres makes it doubtful whether one can 
still legitimately view the nation-State as the politically controlling, and hence unifying, 
organizational norm in international relations. Observations such as these, together with 
reflections on the conspicuous failure of recent war-related policies of the United States, imply rather that we have entered an era in which the interacting, independent units are so 
disparate that references to an “international order” are invalid. These symptoms of the 
erosion of the State seem to make it mandatory that we find other or additional ways to 
determine the configuration of an alien society. 
Civilization recommends itself in this respect because it is more comprehensive as an 
ordering concept than the State: it can cover a host of political formations - armed bands, 
liberation fronts or empires; anarchies or despotisms; transterritorial commonwealths of 
commodity producers, financiers or religionists; as well as multinational political parties. 
Next, also in contrast to the State, a civilization is more enduring in time, even as it is 
usually less precisely defined in space. And finally, civilization is today a more neutral 
reference than the State because, contrary to the latter, it is not associated with typically 
Occidental norms and values. (Bozeman, 1976) 
 
1.4  Quantitative criteria in the definition of war 
 
If we are to take this view that war is simply one form of political intercourse, how do we 
know when the line dividing nonviolent conflict from violence has been meaningfully 
crossed? We probably will not know because of the subtle shades of progression, but 
following the Clausewitz line of thinking, perhaps the dividing line is immaterial, as war is 
ultimately a question of political attitude and subject to all the vagaries of time and place. One 
interesting attempt to fix the threshold quantitatively was made by Richardson (1960) who 
tried to arrange all “deadly quarrels” on a continuum of violent conflict, ranging from one 
killed (murder) to ten million killed (Second World War). The threshold of war was crossed 
when deaths went over 1000. 
 
Singer and Small (1972) and Deutsch and Senghaas (1973) call “war” any series of events 
that meets the following three criteria: 
 
(1) Size: it results in at least 1000 battle deaths (not counting, therefore, the indirect victims 
through famine, lack of shelter, and disease). 
(2) Preparation: it has been prepared in advance , and/or is being maintained, by large-scale 
social organizations through such means as the recruitment, training and deployment of troops 
the acquisition, storage and distribution of arms and ammunition, the making of specific war 
plans and the like, and 
(3) Legitimation: it is being legitimized by an established governmental or 
quasi-governmental organization, so that large-scale killing is viewed not as a crime but as a 
duty. 
 
The definition just given would exclude small incidents among organized forces, large but 
unorganized, poorly legitimated and transitory riots. It would include, however, many large 
and sustained civil wars, since the parties to such wars tend to assume quasi-governmental 
functions in preparing, maintaining, organizing, and legitimating the process of large-scale 
killing. 
 
While qualification is helpful in standardization, the cut-off points for various categories are 
likely to remain highly arbitrary. Besides, the basis for quantification (in this case deaths) 
may not take into account other equally significant dimensions of the use of force. Economic 
war or psychological war may, for example, produce drastic and far-reaching political and 
military consequences not measurable by battlefield casualties (Grieves, 1977). 
 1.5  The judicial conception of war 
 
Closely related to a political definition of war is the judicial conception. Q. Wright (1942; 
1965) describes war as “a legal condition which equally permits two or more hostile groups to 
carry on a conflict by armed force”. The Marqués de Olivert is quoted as declaring that “war 
is a litigation or suit (litigio) between nations that defend their rights, in which force is the 
judge and victory is the judicial award”. This analogical and figurative characterization of war 
is perhaps more literary than factual (Bernard, 1944). 
 
Eagleton (1933), after quoting numerous legal definitions of war from Cicero to the present, 
comes to the conclusion that “the preceding discussion leaves one with a great deal of 
uncertainty as to the meaning of war... [and that] to define war [juridically]... would present 
difficulties. Furthermore, it is desirable to eliminate the word, with all its unpleasant 
psychology, from the vocabulary of international affairs”. 
 
Q. Wright (1926) defined war in the legal sense as “a condition or period of time in which 
special rules permitting and regulating violence between governments prevail, or a procedure 
of regulated violence by which disputes between government are settled”, and war in the 
material sense as “an act or a series of acts of violence by one government against another, or 
a dispute between governments carried on by violence”. 
 
In his classic “A Study of War” (Q. Wright, 1942; 1965) war in the broadest sense was 
defined as “a violent contact of distinct but similar entities. In this sense a collision of stars, a 
fight between a lion and a tiger, a battle between two primitive tribes, and hostilities between 
two modern nations would all be war”. He therefore proposes a narrower definition: “the legal 
condition which equally permits two or more hostile groups to carry on a conflict by armed 
force”. He also noted the convergence with the traditional legal concept of war: 
 
International lawyers and diplomats have usually followed Grotius’ conception of war as “the 
condition of those contending by force as such”, though they have often excluded from the 
conception duels between individuals and insurrections, aggressions, or other conditions of 
violent contention between juridical unequals. Furthermore they have insisted that “force” 
refers to military and naval activities, that is, to “armed forces”, thus excluding from the 
definition contentions involving only moral, legal, or economic force. With these refinements, 
the legal concept of war becomes equivalent to that adopted here. 
 
Kelsen (1942) has distinguished two basic modern interpretations of war, and in each of them 
it is assumed that the existence of war is a matter for objective determination. His concern is 
with the legal status of war. According to the interpretation war is neither a delict nor a 
sanction. It is not a delict because war is not forbidden by any general international law. It 
followed, thus, that any State could war against any other State without violating any law. 
Obviously no State would violate its own laws in going to war, and, in the absence of 
international law forbidding war, there could be no question of a delict. On the other hand, 
war cannot be a sanction either, since there is no international law authorizing war. While 
every State authorizes its own wars and condemns its enemies, this hardly constitutes a legal 
state of affairs. War is, thus, beyond legal praise or blame. 
 
The other position held that there was a general international law forbidding war on principle, 
except where an illegal act, a delict, had been committed. On this account war is either 
blameworthy, because it is a delict, or praiseworthy because it is a sanction.  
In summing up this matter of the legal definition of war, Grob (1949) concluded that “there 
can be no such notion as war in the legal sense”. And Wells (1967) adds: “If there were some 
sense in the expression ‘legal war’, the existence of some international body which assigned 
the criterion for legality would at the same time make the expression otiose or contradictory”. 
 
1.6  The legal definition of war 
 
Those who stress the legal aspects of war maintain that a belligerent status implies 
sovereignty. A struggle can be considered a war only if the contenders are sovereign political 
units (tribes, fiefs, empires, nation-States, etc.). A rebellion against a sovereign authority may 
assume the character of a war, an internal one, only if the rebellious party succeeds in 
establishing a structure for asserting the sovereign power it claims. A certain amount of 
ambiguity is involved, however, in defining the warring parties as both sovereign and 
political. The point can be illustrated in the work of Quincy Wright. 
 
In “A Study of War” Q. Wright (1942; 1965) tries to combine the legal, sociological, military, 
and psychological views of war and offer a synthesis. The resulting definition holds that war 
is a state of law and a form of conflict involving a high degree of legal equality, of hostility, 
and of violence in the relations of organized human groups; in a simpler wording: war is the 
legal condition which equally permits two or more hostile groups to carry on a conflict by 
armed force. Similar definitions are presented at other points in his study. In one, he asserts 
that war may be regarded “from the standpoint of each belligerent” as an extreme 
intensification of military activity, psychological tension, legal power, and social integration; 
and “from the standpoint of all belligerents” as an extreme intensification of simultaneous 
conflicts of armed forces, popular feelings, jural dogmas, and national cultures; he also 
repeats here the definition of war as a legal condition (p. 698). In another place he writes that 
war is at the same time an exceptional legal condition, a phenomenon of intergroup social 
psychology, a species of conflict and a species of violence (p. 700). In all three definitions, 
each of the four viewpoints is represented, but prominence is given to the legal aspect. 
 
In a later study (Q. Wright, 1955), he distinguishes between “war in the legal sense” and “war 
in the material sense”. The legal conception, which he calls the narrower of the two, describes 
situations in which the participating groups are equally permitted to combat each other with 
the use of armed force. If war is seen in a material sense as armed struggle of considerable 
magnitude without regard to the legal status of the contenders, then, Wright concludes, “war 
has usually been employed by States as a method of international politics; it has also been 
employed by insurgents and rebels to gain independence, by governments to suppress 
domestic and colonial revolts, and by international organizations to suppress aggression”. 
This is a description of war as a political instrument. A general definition of war has been 
added: “War is the art of organizing and employing armed force to accomplish the purpose of 
a group”. In an article (Q. Wright, 1968), however, he once more repeats the assumption of 
the primacy of the legal concept of war. 
 
It may be suggested (Lider, 1977) that the ambiguity of Wright’s position derives from his 
combining the constituent elements of war as a social phenomenon (war as a phenomenon of 
intergroup psychology, as a species of conflict, or a species of violence) with certain legal 
regulations to which war was submitted as it became institutionalized (cf. Kotzsch, 1956). 
The general impression that remains from his very valuable contribution to the study of war is nevertheless that he was most concerned with what legal conditions had to be met before an 
armed conflict could be called war. 
 
In a more obvious legal approach, Reves (1945) proposes the “social law” that war, which he 
defines as fighting between units of equal sovereignty, takes place whenever and wherever 
such units come into contact: the corollary to this view is that war ceases the moment sover-
eign power is transferred from the fighting equal units to a larger or higher unit. His 
conclusion is that the problem of the transfer of sovereignty is the sole cause and object of 
war. 
 
This is surely an excellent example of the dangers of legalism. Reves’s definition of war is so 
narrow that it excludes the great majority of, what are commonly called, wars. Moreover, his 
contention that the transfer of sovereignty to a higher unit is the only result of each war is 
clearly invalidated by any fair test. His thesis may imply that the only way war can be 
prevented is by merging nations into a world-State, the single and highest sovereign power 
(Lider, 1977). 
 
A legal definition of war is also presented by Stone (1959): “War is a relation of one or more 
governments to at least one other government, in which at least one of such governments no 
longer permits its relations with the others to be governed by the laws of peace”. 
 
More extended and less explicitly legal is Sorokin’s (1937) concept of war as “the breakdown 
of the crystallized system of relationships” between the States; and Elliott and Merrill’s 
(1961) “the formal disruption of the relationships that bind nations together in (uneasy) 
peacetime harmony”. 
 
Also the following two definitions seem to imply a judicial perspective (as a disruption of a 
normal, rule-governed, more or less peaceful state of affairs): 
Fried (1967) defined war as “the... condition which... permits two or more hostile groups to 
carry on a conflict by armed means”. 
 
E.O. Wilson (1978): “War can be defined as the violent rupture of the intricate and powerful 
fabric of the territorial taboos observed by social groups”. 
 
With minor variants, the most current legal definition of war is the following: War is “ein 
zwischenstaatlicher Gewaltzustand zwischen zwei oder mehreren Staaten, unter Abbruch der 
friedlichen Beziehungen” (Menzel, 1959; Verdrosz, 1964). Or, more comprehensive still: 
“krieg ist ein völkerrechtlicher Gewaltzustand unter Abruch der diplomatischen 
Beziehungen” (Zsifkovits, 1973). 
 
1.7  Multifactoriality of war causation 
 
War as a complex multi-dimensional social phenomenon has so many sources and causes that 
no theory of a single cause can explain its nature. One cannot find a single necessary 
condition and a single sufficient condition; one can only try to find sources, factors, 
conditions important for the occurrence of war (R.M. Williams, 1972). “No major conflict has 
ever had one simple or single cause that has been adduced” (Crawford in Wallace, 1957). “No 
two wars will manifest precisely the same configuration of causal variables” (Corning, 1973). 
“Every war is fought for more than one motive, spurious or real, appreciated or unrealized” 
(Turney-High, 1949). “No two wars take the same form” because of the variety of military-technical correlates (Kingston-McCloughry, 1957). “Why wars take place is not at all 
clear... even more problematic is why a given war occurs between the given States at a given 
time” (Levi, 1974). “... any theory of the causes of war in general or of any war in particular 
that is not inherently eclectic and comprehensive, i.e. which does not take into account at the 
outset the relevance of all sorts of diverse factors, is bound for that very reason to be wrong” 
(Brodie, 1974). Similar “agnostic” visions may be found in the works of Rapaport and Aron. 
 
In recent years, many attempts have been made to place war in some other perspective in 
which the State as actor is not the only unit of analysis. One approach has been to choose 
another main actor, for example, the system (e.g. Midlarsky, 1975). Another has been to 
achieve a synthesis by combining kinds of actors- men, State, and the international system 
(e.g. Waltz, 1959) - or by including internal wars as part of a synthetic concept of war (e.g. 
Rosenau, 1969). 
 
One of the most important challenges to the concept of the State as an actor has come from 
the contention that the behaviour of States is really the behaviour of the men who act in the 
name of the State. Those who have power may not represent the national interests but rather 
the interests of those groups whose views the decision-makers consider relevant. The role that 
interest-groups have in the making of foreign policy of developed countries is a subject of 
recurrent interest. Three different groups have been indicated. The first group is big business 
which it is maintained, gains by war through the close ties between business magnates and 
political leaders. Secondly, special interest has been devoted to the arms industry, which 
through its direct contact with military establishment constitutes an important lobby. The lit-
erature concerning the activity of the “merchants of death” or the “military-industrial 
complex”, as this combination is called, is quite large. Finally, in some analyses those who 
carry out the foreign policy are mentioned as having many opportunities to influence it, and 
as being liable to act in the interests of the ruling class. Moreover, it has been suggested that 
the rules by which international diplomacy is carried out give diplomats an interest in creating 
tensions, crises, and even war. 
 
On the other hand, some scholars deny that the influence of interest groups, although 
important, is decisive for the explanation of war (e.g. Deutsch, 1966). 
 
1.8  Typologies of war 
 
Q. Wright (1942; 1965) has developed a typology of war which distinguishes among four 
categories: (1) the civil war, which takes place within the boundaries of a sovereign nation; 
(2) the balance of power war, in which members of a State system are at war among 
themselves; (3) the defensive war, which acts to guard a civilization against the intrusions of 
an alien culture; and (4) the imperial war, in which one civilization attempts to expand at the 
expense of another. 
 
In this set of distinctions, the boundary conditions of the conflict appear to be the primary 
criteria of classification. Whether a war is categorized as an imperial or civil war apparently 
depends upon the extent to which the conflict is contained within, or extended beyond, certain 
boundaries, implying the presence of both structural differentiation and participation 
(Midlarsky, 1975). 
 Singer, Small and Kraft (1965) follow Wright’s classification in distinguishing among civil, 
colonial and international wars, but with a more focused emphasis in that wars between 
civilizations are not explicitly introduced. 
 
Luard (1968) introduces a somewhat different perspective in his treatment of war; he places 
greater emphasis on the motives of nation-States in their initiation of war, although implicit in 
these reasons for expansion are the notions of complexity and participation. Luard divides 
“Wars of Aggression” into four categories. Expansive wars are defined as those concerned 
with the “conquest of foreign territories not previously controlled”. The Japanese invasions of 
Manchuria and China are examples of this type, as are the German and Soviet invasions of 
various European countries in the interwar period. Irredentist wars are, according to Luard, 
“directed against territories inhabited mainly by people of the same race as the conquerors”. 
The Nazi occupations of Austria and the Sudetenland belong in this category. Strategic wars, 
as a third category, may be motivated by a desire on the part of a nation to enhance its logistic 
and military position vis-à-vis some real or imagined threat. The Soviet invasion of Finland in 
1939 may have been induced by such a perceived threat, and the Israeli participation in the 
Suez campaign might have been similarly motivated. Finally, Luard speaks of coercive wars 
as those which entail the placing of constraints on the operations of a sovereign government. 
Examples of this type provided by Luard are the Arab invasion of Israel in 1948 and the 
Soviet repression of the Hungarian uprising in 1956. 
 
Midlarsky (1975) developed a classification of wars, based on a combination of the premises 
of rank order and scope, along with the explicit use of the variables “structural 
differentiation” and “participation”. In addition, two variables specific to political violence 
are included. These are the intensity of violence in the form of the number killed, and 
duration, as a temporal indicator. Finally, the motivation of actors is taken into account. 
 
Table 1: Varieties of War: 
 
Type of war  Structural 
differentiation 
(a) 
Participation 
(b) 
War duration  No. killed  Motivation of at 
least one set of 
protagonists 
Normative  High  High  Long  Very high  Fundamental change 
in the policy 
framework within 
nations and within 
the international 
system 
Coercive Moderate  Generally 
moderate 
Moderate High  Fundamental  change 
in the policy 
framework within 
nations and within a 
particular region 
Regional  Low to moderate  Moderate 
generally 
Moderate Low  to 
moderate 
Moderate changes 
within a regional 
policy framework 
Territorial  Very low  Limited to two  Short to moderate  Low to 
moderate 
Territorial change 
(a) Alliances and/or military-industrial organization 
(b) Protagonists and size of armies 
 Following the ordering principle of structural differentiation or complexity, the simplest unit 
in international warfare is chosen as the basis for the lowest level of warfare, the territorial 
war. This form of conflict concerns the authoritative administration of a given territory. The 
contested territory acts as the primary focus of conflict, and seldom do other issues intrude 
into the principal focus of attention. Conceptually, this is the simplest and most primitive of 
wars since the protagonists are in conflict over one of the most tangible, visible, and 
necessary of human commodities. In addition, the protagonists do not exceed two in number 
and, therefore, participation is at a minimum. Examples of this type are the Chaco War 
between Bolivia and Paraguay, as well as the Italo-Turkish War of 1911-1912. In the former 
conflict, the Chaco Boreal, lying between Bolivia and Paraguay, was the territory at issue, and 
in the second, the political control of  Libya was the primary source of conflict. 
 
A second category, the regional war, has also as a point of issue the administration of a given 
territorial entity. However, the policy framework and power relations of an entire region may 
be involved, and the protagonists generally exceed two in number. The presence of additional 
participants and their policy goals increases both the participation and complexity of this type 
of war. The War of the Pacific between Bolivia and Peru on the one hand, and Chile on the 
other, may be illustrative of this category, as are the First and Second Balkan Wars. In each of 
these instances, the crucial issues not only involved the authoritative administration of given 
territories, but also concerned the specific policy framework governing a given region. 
Chilean dominance of the Pacific coastal region following the War of the Pacific replaced 
prior Bolivian and Peruvian control of trade and economic development in that area. The 
consequences of the two Balkan Wars included a reduction of Turkish and Bulgarian 
importance in the determination of policies and international relations for that region. 
The coercive war as a third category depends somewhat on the number of participants, but 
more so on the extent of transformation of policy both internal to a nation-state and in its 
regional environment. Thus, the complexity of policy issues, as well as additional 
participation, are present here. Whereas the regional war may alter a policy framework, the 
coercive war transforms it. The intention of at least one of the protagonists is to reshape 
drastically the existing state of relationships among a small number of nations. As in the 
territorial and regional wars, the authoritative administration of certain geographical entities is 
also at issue. Examples of coercive wars are the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871 and the 
Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1941. In the former, the objective of German and French 
diplomacy was not simply the control of certain territories such as Alsace-Lorraine, but the 
future of the policy framework for Western Europe. Moreover, as a result of this war, the 
structure of diplomatic relationships in the region was drastically altered by the attendant 
unification of Germany. Indeed, the emergence of a unipolar diplomatic system centered at 
Berlin has been observed to be a consequence of this war. The Sino-Japanese War of the late 
1930’s was, in its essentials, a conflict for the control of the Chinese heartland and all of East 
Asia. Japanese hegemony within the region was the goal of that country’s policy makers. 
 
Finally, the normative war includes the coercive aspects of the previous category, and in 
addition, includes elements of rebellion against an international normative framework. As 
such, the number of participants is larger than for any of the other categories, and the intensity 
and scope of desired change on the part of one set of protagonists also are greater. As before, 
the element of territoriality also is germane to the conflict. The Thirty Years’ War, ending 
only in the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, and the Napoleonic Wars are earlier examples of this 
type. In both World Wars I and II, the norms governing international discourse were 
challenged by a group of nations, and in the second of these wars in particular, the explicit rejection by the Axis Powers of the Treaty of Versailles and League Covenant constituted a 
challenge to the dominant norms of the international system. 
 
Perhaps it is only when human beings clash over important abstractions and modes of 
civilization that the most widespread and intense wars occur, just as the bloodiest civil wars 
are fought over the “appropriate” forms of domestic socio-political relationships. In any 
event, four categories are posited for the occurrence of international warfare. These form a 
rank-ordered set in which each element in a lower rank also is found at all levels above it. 
 
Midlarsky (1975) points to certain similarities between his categorization and those 
developed for internal violence. For example, Rosenau (1964) lists three types of internal war, 
“Personnel” wars, seen as fought only over the issues as who is to occupy the roles of 
government (as in many Latin American coups); “Authority” wars, seen as fought in addition 
over the arrangements for occupancy of these roles (such as electoral methods or 
opportunities for indigenous as opposed to colonial persons to occupy them) (e.g. the struggle 
in Rhodesia); and “Structural” wars, seen as fought over the social and economic structure of 
the society as well as the other two issues (as in the French or Russian revolutions, or the 
Spanish Civil War). 
 
Lasswell and Kaplan (1950) made the same distinction fourteen years earlier, naming the 
three types Palace, Political, and Social Revolutions, while Huntington (1962) distinguished 
Governmental, Reform and Revolutionary Coups in essentially the same way. 
 
Table 2: Typology of behavioral Violence (Eckhardt & Köhler, 1980) 
 
Symmetric   Imperial Involvement    No Imperial Involvement
Relations   Imperial Power Conflicts  International Conflicts
Involving one or more    Without any active, military 
imperial powers on both  involvement of imperial powers, 
sides of the conflict,    such as the Chaco War, 1928-35. 
such as the two world    All border conflicts were placed 
wars in this century;    in this category 
and also imperial inter- 
vention on both sides of 
a civil conflict, such as 
the Spanish Civil War. 
 
Asymmetric   Imperial Conquests
Relations    of nonimperial nations or 
territories,  such as the 
Sino-Japanese War, 1937-45 
 
Imperial Civil Conflicts    Civil Conflicts 
involving one or more    with no apparent imperial 
imperial powers on one    involvement of an active, 
side of the conflict only,  military nature, such as 
such as the Vietnam War,  the Civil War of Nigeria 
1960-74.     1967-70. 
 
 2  WAR: RESEARCH ON DATA 
 
2.1  Statistics of deadly quarrels 
 
An effort to examine and classify violent deaths was made by Lewis F. Richardson, a 
mathematical physicist and meteorologist, who devoted many years to the careful collection 
and analysis of statistics on violent deaths from all causes. Quincy Wright and C.C. Lienan 
prepared the manuscript of Richardson’s “Statistics of Deadly Quarrels”, published after 
Richardson’s death in 1953. Before he died, Richardson had collected exhaustive statistics on 
violent conflicts from 1820 to 1929 and supplemental statistics on those from 1930 to 1949. 
The magnitude of a fatal quarrel is defined to be the logarithm to the base ten of the number 
of people who died because of that quarrel. The magnitude will be denoted by µ [mu]. The 
range of magnitude extends from 0 for a murder involving only one death, to 7.4 for the 
Second World War. Other well-known wars had magnitudes as follows: 1899-1902 British 
versus Boers 4.4; 1939-40 Russians versus Finns 4.83; 1861-65 North American Civil War 
5.8. The magnitude of a war is usually known to within ± 0.2; so that a classification by unit 
ranges of magnitude is meaningful. The ranges have been marked off at 7.5, 6.5, 5.5, 4.5, 3.5, 
2.5, 1.5 and perhaps at 0.5 and -0.5. 
 
Steinmetz (1907; 1929) formulated the “law of relatively diminishing war casualties”. 
Discussing the casualty figures from wars, Q. Wright (1965) notes the following: 
 
A fifth trend has been toward an increased human and economic cost of war, both 
absolutely and relative to the population. The human cost of war is a difficult problem to 
get data upon. The proportion of persons engaged in a battle who are killed has probably 
tended to decline. During the Middle Ages 30 to 50 percent of those engaged in battle were 
often killed or wounded. In the sixteenth century 40 percent of the defeated side might be 
killed or wounded and about 10 percent of the victors. The latter cut down the members of 
the defeated army as they ran away. Thus at the beginning of the modern period the 
average casualties in battle were probably about 25 percent of those engaged. In the three 
succeeding centuries the proportion has been estimated as 20, 15, and 10 percent, 
respectively, and in the twentieth century about 6 percent. Prior to 1900 about a quarter of 
the battle casualties died, and in the First World War about a third; thus the proportion of 
those engaged in a battle who die as a direct consequence of the battle seems to have 
declined from about 6 percent to about 2 percent in the last three centuries. The proportion 
of the population engaged in the armies, however, has tended to become larger, and the 
number of battles has tended to increase. As a result, the proportion of the population 
dying as a direct consequence of battle has tended to increase. The losses from disease in 
armies has declined. Dumas and Vedel-Peterson (1923) give figures of the Napoleonic 
period suggesting that 80 or 90 percent of the total army losses were from disease. Von 
Bloch (1899) states that in the nineteenth century this proportion averaged 65 percent. In 
the First World War, while disease accounted for 30 percent of the losses in the Russian 
army and 26 percent in the American army, in the German army only 10 percent of deaths 
were from this cause. It has been estimated that, of 1,000 deaths in the French population 
in the seventeenth century, about 11 died in active military service. The corresponding 
figure for the eighteenth century is 27; for the nineteenth, 30; and for the twentieth, 63. For 
England the corresponding figures for these four centuries are 15, 14, 6, and 48. (Q. 
Wright, 1965). 
 Further, “taking all factors into consideration, the proportion of deaths attributable to military 
service and to hostilities have probably increased among European countries from about 2 
percent in the 17th to about 3 percent in the 20th century” (Alker and Bock, 1972). Sorokin 
(1937) noted that even before the Second World War, the casualty figure for the first quarter 
of the twentieth century in Europe exceeded “the total casualties for all the preceding 
centuries taken together... The curse or privilege to be the most devastating or most bloody 
war century”, Sorokin said, “belongs to the twentieth; in one quarter century it imposed upon 
the population a `blood tribute’ far greater than that imposed by any of the whole centuries 
compared”. 
 
Relative casualties also seemed to rise. Casualties as proportions of the general population 
and of civilians generally go up. There is a dip which is particularly pronounced in the 
nineteenth century, but then a sharp upsurge in the twentieth. Interestingly, the proportion of 
casualties in the armed forces moves almost continuously upward. 
 
This trend in relative casualties is matched in part by the development of what has been called 
the “military participation ratio” (Andreski, 1968) - the proportion of the army to the 
population. This goes up through the seventeenth century, dips in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth, and then rises slightly again, lending some support to the hypothesis that the 
military participation ratio is an important determinant of war. Nevertheless, the relatively 
small increase in the relation of the military participation ratio in the twentieth century is not 
enough to explain the sharp upsurge in casualties. Earlier wars caused massive casualties in 
civilian populations. If we take the Thirty Years War as an example, one estimate reports an 
absolute decline in the population of the German Empire from 21 to 13.5 million between 
1618 and 1648 (Leckie, 1970). 
 
In contemporary times, heavy civilian casualties have resulted from technological advance. In 
particular, techniques of aerial bombardment, not previously available, have taken a 
significant civilian toll. At the same time modern medicine and logistics have probably 
worked to bring down indirect mortality (Beer, 1974). 
 
Table 3 
The total number of persons who died because of quarrels during the 126 years from 
1820 to 1945 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  Ends of range of magnitude      Total numbers of deaths in millions 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    7  ±  ½         36.00 
    6  ±  ½           6.70 
    5  ±  ½           3.40 
    4  ±  ½           0.75 
    3  ±  ½           0.30 
    2  ±  ½           0.40 
    1  ±  ½           2.20 
    0  ±  ½           9.70 
           Total  59.00 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
A remarkable feature of the above table is that the heavy loss of life occurred at the two ends 
of the sequence of magnitudes, namely the world wars and the murders. The small wars contributed much less to the total. The total deaths because of quarrels should be compared 
with the total deaths from all causes. There are particulars given by de Jastrzebski (E, Death 
Rate), and in the Statistical Year Books of the League of Nations, which allow the total to be 
estimated. A mean world population of 1.5 times 10
9 and a mean death rate of 20 per 
thousand per year would give during 126 years 3.8 times 10
9 deaths from all causes. Of these 
the part caused by quarrels was 1.6 percent. This is less than one might have guessed from the 
large amount of attention which quarrels attract. Those who enjoy wars can excuse their taste 
by saying that wars after all are much less deadly than disease (Richardson, 1960). 
 
Thus, during that 126-year period, less than two out of every hundred deaths appear to have 
been due to lethal violence. Even if one includes suicides, plus unintended deaths from 
starvation and disease, the deaths traceable to lethal violence appear to be fewer than three out 
of every hundred. Indeed, one striking fact that Richardson’s data underline is that the 
greatest risk from even this degree of lethal violence over the 126-year period was from very 
large-scale wars. World Wars I and II together account for 36 million out of the entire 59 
million deaths in his table. Apart from these two conflicts, a person’s chance of dying from 
the direct results of any form of lethal conflict was far less than one in one hundred. The 
chance of eventually dying as a murder victim was a little over one in four hundred 
(Prosterman, 1972). 
 
2.2  Incidence and frequency 
 
In modern civilization - since about 1500 - Q. Wright (1942; 1965) found there had been at 
least 284 wars and some 3,000 battles. He defined a battle as involving more than 1,000 
casualties on land or more than 500 at sea; a war was a hostile encounter which involved 
more than 50,000 troops or which was legally declared as war. But, he warned, these were 
inadequate measures of human violence. The United States, for instance, had been involved in 
only 165 of the “official” battles but it had fought in more than 9,000 hostile encounters. 
“There have probably been over a quarter of a million such hostile encounters in the civilized 
world since the year of 1500, an average of over 500 a year”. 
 
 Table  4 
Sorokin’s estimate of war casualties in Europe, by centuries, 1000-1925 (000’s omitted) 
 
Country  11th 12th 13th 14th 15th 16th 17th 18th 19th 20th Averag
e  since 
1600 
France  1  4  11 59 61 107  658  1,055  1,769  3,682  1,791 
Austria    8  11  7  100 257 1,560  1,505  226 3,000  1,573 
G.  Britain  1  7  17 64 86 91 160  310  141  3,095  901 
Russia  5  12 29 37 38 118  119  752  777  6,371  2,005 
Germany         360  459  6,060  2,293 
Spain       160  559  94  166  44  216 
Netherlands       64  290  170  34   124 
Italy       17  41  54  1,783  474 
Poland
1      66  91  348  219   219 
Total  7  31  68  167 385 863 3,454  4,635  3,845  24,035   
Per 1,000 
population 
  2 5 8 10  15  37  33  15  54   
1 Poland and Lithuania 
 
Table 5 shows some of the main statistics of war over the past four centuries. 
 Century  16th  17th 18th 19th  20th 
No. of wars  63  64  38  89  30 (to 1964) 
No. of battles  87  239  781  651  > 1,000 
No. battles/war  1-2  4  20  7  > 30 
Average length of war (years)  2.9  2.7  2.7  1.4  4.0 
% time at war  65  65  38  28  18 
Average no. nations/war  2.4  2.6  3.7  3.2  4.8 
Average size forces on each 
side 
18,000  22,000 22,000 35,000  100,000  (to  1940) 
% battles outside Europe  0  0  2  13  25 (to 1964) 
% of forces killed  -  25  15  10  6 
% of warring nation killed  1,5  3,7  3.3  1,5  8.8 
Violence  Index  180  500 370 120  3,080 
Wars: those legally declared or involving more than 50,000 troops. 
Battles: those involving more than 1,000 casualties on land or 500 at sea. 
Table after Clarke (1971) based on data from Q. Wright (1942; 1965), Sorokin (1937) and Institut Français de 
Polémologie, “Periodicité et intensité des actions de guerre (1200 à 1945)” in Guerres et Paix, Vol. II, 1968. 
 
The “Violence Index” (intensity of wars) shows that even before the Second World War 
violence was more than 25 times greater in this century than the last; it was more than 150 
times greater than in the twelfth century. 
 
Battles, as well as becoming more frequent, are becoming much larger - as their names reveal. 
“They were once called after the bridges or towns where they took place. By the time of the 
First World War they were named after rivers - the Battle of the Somme - or even regions - 
the Battle of Champagne. By the Second World War they were called after countries or 
oceans: the Battle of Britain, the Battle of France and even the Battle of the Atlantic. The 
trend appears to lead inevitably to the nuclear holocaust that would be the Battle of the Globe 
(Clarke, 1971). Also Klingberg (1966) discovered how quickly violence was escalating: 
 
  Table 6: The escalation of violence 
 
War  Date  Average deaths per day 
Napoleonic 1790-1815  233 
Crimean 1854-1856  1,075 
Balkan 1912-1913  1,941 
World War I  1914-1918  5,449 
World War II  1919-1945  7,738 
(Hiroshima)  August 6th, 1945  80,000 
 
So far nearly 90 people out of every thousand have been killed as a direct result of war in this 
century compared with only 15 in the last. The number of people involved in the increasing 
number of battles is also getting much larger. The battles themselves last much longer than 
they used to. Since the Second World War about 20 million men have been under arms, 
roughly 7 out of every 1,000 (and this excludes the huge numbers of people employed in war 
industries of various kinds). In seventeenth-century Europe only 3 in every 1,000 were under 
arms (Clarke, 1971). 
 
Finally, there are signs that war has recently become more common. Greaves (1962) has 
counted no less than 14,542 wars in the period 3600 B.C. to 1962 A.D. He found that there was an average of 2.61 new wars every year up to the beginning of the Second World War. 
Since it ended, however, the average has risen to 2.94. 
 
According to Kende (1971 et seq.) 116 wars, both international and internal, have occurred 
since the Second World War, involving 81 States. Approximately 25 million people were 
killed in those wars. 
“There is a more widespread opinion than in any other period of history that war has not 
functioned well in the twentieth century”, Q. Wright (1942; 1965) concludes with scholarly 
understatement. “From being a generally accepted instrument of statesmanship, deplored by 
only a few, war has, during the modern period, come to be generally recognized as a 
problem”. 
Stefflre (1974) utilized the Richardson (1960) and Singer and Small (1972) data for long-term 
forecasting: 
 
  Table 7: War forecasting data 
 
Richardson 
war casualties 
Singer & Small 
No. combatants killed 
Period 
Median 
population 
thousand 
millions 
Number of 
countries in 
system 
Number 
killed 
Proportion 
of 
population 
killed 
Number 
killed 
Proportion 
of 
population 
killed 
1815-45  1.05 27.1 364,400  0.00032  244,700  0.00024 
1846-75  1.20 37.4 5,050,750  0.00421  889,800  0.00074 
1876-1905  1.50 37.7 1,067,000  0.00071  600,100  0.0004 
1906-35  1.80 55.0 18,949,700  0.01052  9,084,300  0.0050 
1936-65  2.50 80.4 23,178,300  0.00927  18,370,800  0.0073 
1966-95  5.00 (est)  180 (est)  -  -  -  - 
 
Stefflre concluded: 
 
From these data, one could easily hypothesize the following rule: for each interval in which 
the human population doubles, there occur wars in which  ten times as many people are killed 
as are killed by wars in the previous such interval. One way of “formalizing” this rule is 
through the following equation. 
   
Yt + 1 / Yt  =  Xt + 1 / Xt
10                   2    
 
where Yt = number of people killed by wars in the interval (t = 1,t) 
Xt = population of the earth at time t. 
 
It is estimated by extrapolation that 10% of the 1950-1999 median population will be killed 
during that period, or about 400,000,000 people. 
 
Beer (1974) tried to calculate the sum total of human lives sacrificed to war. He presented a 
sophisticated extrapolated estimate of more than 14,000 major and minor wars in world 
history (5,595 years) with an estimated grand total of one billion direct war casualties. Beer 
(1974) adds the following comment: 
 If the trend we have suggested is correct, it carries somewhat paradoxical aspects for the 
past, the present, and the future. First, the distant past may have involved more wars but 
fewer casualties - people fighting more but killing each other less. 
A second paradox concerns the present. Our times may include both more peaceful life 
and less peaceful death than the past. Progressive war concentration also implies peace 
concentration. If wars were more numerous, long, and frequent in the past, peace was 
necessarily shorter and more fragmented. If today wars are indeed fewer, less frequent, 
and shorter, peace by definition is longer and more continuous. Increases in individual life 
expectancy resulting from developing technology complement the peaceful effects of war 
concentration. 
At the same time, there is also more war-related death. In the past the absolute number and 
relative proportion of those who met warlike deaths were smaller than today. While today 
the absolute amount of peaceful life may be greater, the chances of the average citizen 
completing his life in peace are also reduced. Finally, a historical trend of war 
concentration and aggravation has paradoxical implications for the future. Declining 
general incidence of war or the termination of any particular military conflict is obviously 
welcome. Yet they do not necessarily imply the elimination or even reduction of the 
human or material costs of war. Instead, longer interwar periods may be way-stations for 
subsequent wars which may inflict even greater casualties than the ones which preceded 
them. In the last quarter of the twentieth century, we may see more peace, but war will 
continue to be a problem of much more than historical interest. 
 
Eckhardt and Azar (1978) compiled a list of 265 major world conflicts and 105 major 
interventions for the years 1945 to 1975. The list was analysed as to the regional, temporal, 
and typal distributions of conflict-years, intervention-years, and intervening years of external 
parties. 
 
The finding that most major conflicts from 1945 to 1975 were happening in the Third World 
was quite consistent with the results of other authors. The finding that major conflicts were 
increasing from 1945 to 1970 was also quite consistent with the results of previous studies. 
The finding that the various types and sub-types of conflict were increasing at a relatively 
equal rate was a new finding which questioned Kende’s (1971) emphasis on the relative 
increase in civil anti-regime wars. Admittedly, Eckhardt and Azar’s civil types of conflict did 
not necessarily coincide with Kende’s civil anti-regime wars, but there was presumably 
considerable overlap between them. The measure of intervention followed the same temporal 
pattern as the measure of conflict, which questioned Kende’s (1971) emphasis on the relative 
increase in foreign interventions, but this emphasis was changed by Kende (1977). Although 
these interventions did increase from 1945 to 1970, they did not increase any more than the 
increase in conflicts. 
 
Finally, Eckhardt and Azar’s finding that both conflicts and interventions decreased in 
1971-1975 questioned SIPRI’s (1975) contention that conflicts were continually on the 
increase up to 1974. This new finding, however, was quite consistent with Kende’s (1977) 
results. This new finding was extremely important in suggesting that something new was 
happening in the world since 1970. This new happening in 1971-1975 was associated with 
relatively more conflicts in the Middle East and far fewer conflicts in both regions of Asia, 
fewer internationalized civil conflicts, more self-management of major conflicts in the Middle 
East, and less Western intervention in world conflicts generally. These findings for 
1971-1975 may be compressed into two basic phenomena: (1) less conflict in the world in general, and (2) even less  Western intervention of the overt military kind in world conflicts 
(Eckhardt and Azar, 1978). 
 
Kende’s (1978) general examination of the wars of the last ten years partly confirms his 
earlier findings, partly discloses and proves new phenomena. The overall pattern has not 
altered, he reports. The picture is still characterized by the fact that the wars are parts of the 
great international processes and are far from having ceased. Their arena is still the Third 
World. They are, as before, primarily internal wars which gain their international character 
from the activity, often coupled with military participation, of the armed forces of countries 
far away. However, another change has also taken place: the decreasing war trend, a 
fundamental characteristic of the last ten years. 
 
A further change is the fact that one of the fundamental motives of the wars of the last 32 
years - the determination of the colonial people to attain independence - has largely ceased. 
The world atlas is today covered almost exclusively with the colours of independent national 
States. As a practical consequence, the cause of internal conflicts within the frontiers of the 
country will increasingly be rooted in social, class, etc., conflicts and anti-regime fights. The 
achievement of national independence and the transformation of certain regions into national 
States lead necessarily to the intensification of internal power conflicts, which may result not 
only in the outbreak of anti-regime wars of a social character; it also leads to the 
intensification of other internal-tribal, minority, religious-conflicts which again can easily 
lead to war. 
 
Q. Wright (1965) claims in the second edition of A Study of War that “conditions relevant to 
war have changed more radically since 1942... than in any equal of human history”. Yet, as 
seen above, many of the measures of war have not changed appreciably since the end of the 
Second World War. Conflicts may have become somewhat more frequent, but as they have 
also been waged on a lesser scale, there is doubt that the overall level of violence is higher 
today (Wood, 1968). Even the outcomes of conflicts have been shown to be little different in 
the 1945-1965 period from the 1919-1939 period (Holsti, 1966). 
 
There is general consensus, however, that during this period there has been (1) a decline in 
conventional inter-State wars, in wars fought for territorial gains, in colonial-imperial wars, 
and in wars fought in Europe or America, and (2) an increase in ethno-national (including 
irredentist and secessionist) wars, fought within the boundaries of a single State, and in wars 
fought in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East (for short, the “Third World”) (Denton, 1966; 
Kende, 1971 et seq.; Huntington, 1962; Luard, 1968; Wood, 1968; Q. Wright, 1965). 
Most of these assertions are supported statistically, but there is argument over the meaning of 
the figures. Is it true, for example, that internal wars have increased significantly since 1945? 
Wood (1968) examines 128 conflicts since 1898, of which 84 took place since 1939. Of these 
84, only 28 were inter-State conflicts while the remainder were insurgencies, civil wars, or 
coups d’état on a scale large enough to meet his operational definition. 
 
Wood’s figures show that conflicts in Asia, Africa and the Middle East have in fact 
outnumbered those in Europe and the Americas during every decade since 1898 except 1908-
1917. The prominence of Third World conflicts is therefore not new, though the nature of 
wars in that area has changed. Moreover, some of the reasons cited for the rise of Third World 
violence are not proven. Rosecrance (1963) believes that internal instability may be a lesser 
cause of foreign aggression now than in the nineteenth century, since better means of internal 
control exist.  
Contrary to the view that rapid growth causes internal and external instability (Olson, 1963), 
Haas (1965) found a higher incidence of foreign conflict among States at both ends of the 
development scale. 
 
2.3  Periodicity 
 
Attempts have been made to discern macroscopic patterns in the history of war. In 1923, a 
Russian astronomer and archaeologist, Tchijevski, published what he called an “lndex of 
Mass Human Excitability”. His information was collected from 72 countries and covered the 
period 500 B.C. to 1922 A.D. His principal conclusion was that humans behave excitedly - 
and violently - in waves which break upon society nine times every century. Each wave, he 
claimed, lasted for 11.1 years and reached its peak one year before the time of maximum 
sun-spot activity. An American psychologist, Wheeler, followed up with a similar study in 
1943. His conclusions were no less startling. Civil wars, according to Wheeler, occurred in 
waves with a 170-year period. Every third wave was more severe than the other two, giving a 
cycle of drastic civil violence every 510 years. The cause, he claimed, was not sun-spots but 
droughts - which also occurred every 170 years. In the meantime Sorokin (1937) discounted 
both linear and cyclical theories of change in warfare: “the curve just fluctuates, and that is 
all”. 
 
However, Q. Wright (1942; 1965) also found cycles in human hostilities. “Tabulations of the 
dates at which battle honours have been given to British regiments show a remarkable 
fifty-year fluctuation in the frequency of such battles”. He found similar evidence from other 
battles and in the war casualty rate in England, France and the United States. This 50-year 
cycle Q. Wright attributes to the passage of two generations - the first is thought to regard war 
as undesirable and the second believes it to be romantic. 
 
In his Statistics of Deadly Quarrels, Richardson (1960) found a similar cycle from 15 to 30 
years long: “We may suppose that the generation who had not fought in the earlier war, but 
who were brought up on tales about its romance, heroism, and about the wickedness of the 
enemy, became influential from 30 to 60 years after the war ended and so delayed the process 
of forgiving and forgetting”. What started as a sun-spot explanation in the 1920s has now 
become a “human” explanation, which is far more understandable. In the last analysis all wars 
are declared by humans and so caused by them (Clarke, 1971). 
 
Using the Richardson data, Denton (1966) detected a cyclical recurrence of international 
conflict for the period 1820-1949. In a later study, Denton and Phillips (1968) tested both the 
Richardson and the Q. Wright data for the period 480-1900, for evidence of short-term and 
long-term fluctuations in war and peace. They found a regular upsurge of violence every 25 
years on average (about 20 years before 1680, and 30 years after this date), and also a more 
extended fluctuation every 80-120 years. They also explained the shorter cycle as a 
“generation effect”. 
 
They account for the longer cycle in terms of an “action-reaction” process, a regular 
alternation between periods of turmoil when philosophers emphasize the virtues of political 
stability, and times of peace when they grasp the opportunity to exalt change and the 
achievement of ideals. 
 Singer and Small (1972) analysed international wars for the period 1816-1965 as part of 
Singer’s “Correlates of War” (COW) project. They concluded that the incidence of it seemed 
to be “neither waxing nor waning”, with only a “modest increase in the severity and 
magnitude of war over the entire span”. Their quantitative treatments also suggest a 20-40 
year generational cycle in the level of world violence: “discrete wars do not necessarily come 
and go with regularity but with some level of inter-State violence almost always present; there 
are distinct and periodic fluctuations in the amount of that violence”. 
 
Re-analysis of the pattern of outbreaks in Q. Wright’s wars (a peace period of about 50 years 
between major war outbreaks and concentrations) suggested two alternative interpretations - 
either sheer chance, or a much longer cycle than Wright had assumed, about 200 years from 
peak to peak (Sorokin, 1937; Richardson, 1960; Moyal, 1949; Singer and Small, 1972). 
Within particular regions cycles might also exist, with different momentum. For example, 
Chinese history seemed to show regularities between 100 and 200 years (Lee, 1931; Jouary, 
1969). 
 
Less extended analysis has been done on the length of war periods. Yet the study of escalation 
processes within wars also suggests interior regularities and peaking behaviour (Horvath, 
1968; Voevodski, 1968; 1972). Some cyclic patterns in quantitative war phenomena have also 
been found by Houweling and Siccama (1977). See also Beer (1974). 
 
2.4 Factors related to occurrence of modern wars 
 
At various points in his text, Richardson (1960) in his “Statistics of Deadly Quarrels” 
attempted to relate the occurrence of wars to observed characteristics of the opposing groups, 
whether the groups were entire states or groups within states in civil conflict. His tentative 
conclusions are summarized by the editors (Q. Wright and Lienan) in their Introduction: 
 
•  States have varied from one another in the frequency of their participation in wars 
during this period (1820-1945), but each has varied so much during its history that 
none can be properly characterized as inherently belligerent or inherently pacific. The 
problem of war does not arise from the diabolism of one or a few States. 
•  States have tended to become involved in wars in proportion to the number of States 
with which they have common frontiers. Contiguity has been an important factor in 
war during this period. 
•  Common citizenship has not assured peace, nationalism has both induced and 
prevented wars, but there appear to have been pacifying influences such as common 
government, intermarriage, common fears, and common culture tending to prevent 
civil and local wars. The actual occurrence of war has been far less than would be 
expected from the opportunities for war presented by geographical contiguity. Such 
occurrences have been even less, proportionately, as the opportunities for war have 
increased through the advance of sea and air power. 
•  The longer groups have been united by common government, the less has been the 
probability of war between them. 
•  Allies in one war may become enemies in the next, but alliances seem to have had 
some influence in preventing war between former allies. That influence, however, 
declines with the passage of time since the war alliance. 
•  Desire for revenge seems to have been an important cause of war during this period, 
declining as the inciting war recedes in history but rising slightly after a generation. •  Economic causes seem to have figured directly in less than 29 percent of the wars 
since 1820 and have been more important in small than in large wars. Among such 
causes taxation of colonials and minorities; economic assistance to an enemy; 
restrictions on movements of capital, trade and migration: and dissatisfaction of 
soldiers have had an influence, the importance of which has been approximately in 
this order. The influence of all these factors together has been less than that of quarrels 
over territory which may be more political than economic. Relative wealth and 
poverty seem to have had very little  influence during this period, contrary to the 
Marxian assumption that wars arise from class conflict. 
•  Similarity and difference of language seem to have had little influence on the 
occurrence of wars during this period, contrary to the belief of some advocates of 
universal languages, except that the Chinese language has been correlated with 
peacefulness and Spanish with warlikeness. 
•  Similarity of religion seems not to have made for peace, except in the case of 
Confucianism, but differences of religion have apparently caused war, especially the 
differences of Christianity and Islam. The statistics suggest, but do not prove, that 
“Christianity incited war between its adherents”. 
•  The larger the number of belligerents in a war, the more neutrals have tended to be 
drawn in. Wars with many participants have tended to be longer and less frequent. 
•  A trend for war to become indivisible, that is, for every war to become universal, has 
not been proved. Most wars have been localized. Neutrals have tended to become 
belligerents only if two or more world powers have been fighting each other. In 
proportion to their possible contacts for warmaking, sea powers seem to have been 
less belligerent than land powers. 
•  International relations cannot be considered a chaotic field with all nations equally 
likely to be infected by war. Geographical relations have exerted great influence. (Q. 
Wright and Lienan, in Richardson, 1960). 
 
Geography has emerged as prominently associated with the probability of a State’s going to 
war. Richardson (1960) found that the number of wars fought by a State was proportionate to 
the number of bordering States. This result has been challenged by Rummel (1968) for the 
1955-1957 period, but Wesley (1969) points out that “geographical opportunity” - a measure 
of the length of borders and population density along them - can also be used to explain 
Richardson’s result. Q. Wright (1965) determined that the probability of war between two 
States was a function of the distance between them and the policies pursued. In this case 
Rummel’s (1968) data also reflect a high correlation between total conflict and low 
geographic distance. Such results suggest that the ancient Indian theorist, Kautilya, was not 
far wrong in suggesting that between neighbouring States, enmity is the norm (see Kammler, 
1970; Kautilya arthasastra, 1961), or, putting it in modern terms, that contiguity predisposes 
to conflict (Dowty and Kochan, 1974). Major causes of deviation from this norm are 
apparently (1) geographically ambiguous relationships (as when three States all border each 
other, as illustrated by Kammler (1970) in graph theory and defined by Dowty (1969), as 
“tension triangles”), (2) the overshadowing of local rivalries by a large common threat that 
forces or encourages the formation of a “security community” (Deutsch et al., 1957), and (3) 
ideological factors (Dowty and Kochan, 1974). 
 
2.5 Societal development and war 
 Midlarsky and Thomas (1975) systematically examined the possible relationships between 
domestic social structure and international warfare. Specifically, they inquired into the 
relationship, if any, between societal development and war. They made a cluster analysis of 
88 variables and 65 cases (historical political systems from ancient Greece until the industrial 
era). Perhaps the most surprising and potentially important feature of their analysis is “the 
virtual absence of any important effect of societal development on war. Whether a society is 
structurally complex and, therefore, differentiated appears to have little bearing on its war 
experience. The most traditional and/or ‘primitive’ society may have virtually the same 
probability of experiencing war as the most developed nations”. 
 
Furthermore they found a significant effect of the military dimension on war duration. 
Whereas the bureaucracy variable has a strong, positive, and significant effect on battle 
casualties, it has a relatively strong and negative, although nonsignificant, effect on duration. 
Midlarsky and Thomas (1975) comment: 
 
There exist some important implications of the lack of a relationship between societal 
development and war. Those who would hope for eventual peace through the development 
of nations appear to have little evidence to support their position, at least within the confines 
of the present study. On the other hand, there exist societal sectors, such as the military or 
bureaucracy which, in the contemporary world, may have a stake in the continuation of war. 
This pessimistic evaluation of the role of the nation-State in future peace-keeping efforts 
suggests that making peace through international institutions may have a better chance of 
success. 
 
2.6 War and societal characteristics 
 
In correlating variables indicating warlike behavior of States with some 200 societal 
characteristics, very few of the correlation coefficients have exceeded the level of +.40. 
Nevertheless, the higher and more statistically significant findings do reveal a pattern 
(Rummel, 1966 et seq.; Haas, 1972, 1974). Nondiplomatic, but nonviolent, foreign conflict is 
highly related to resort to international aggression. The use of military mobilizations, troop 
movements, high levels of military expenditures per GNP, threats and severances of 
diplomatic relations are more closely associated with such indicators as numbers of wars, 
persons killed in wars, and violent military actions short of full-fledged wars. Participation in 
foreign affairs per se seems to make a country more likely to become involved in war. Bloc 
prominence, for example, is associated with all types of foreign violence. High levels in 
receiving or contributing to foreign aid also are correlated with warlike behavior. Countries 
with many representatives at the United Nations find themselves involved in wars most 
frequently. Economic underdevelopment indicators are more in line with Plato’s 
recommendation for a Spartan economy. Aggressiveness is lower among countries with 
higher increments in per capita electricity production and with more economic equality. High 
unemployment makes for more aggressiveness, and high density in the use of railroads (rail 
freight/rail length) is associated with a lower incidence of war. Social unrest manifests itself 
in three main causes of death: suicides, homicides and alcoholism. Using time-lagged 
longitudinal correlations, Haas discovers that countries with high rates of suicides and fatal 
alcoholism are much more likely to be participants in arms races. Countries with rising rates 
of homicides, on the contrary, decrease their financing of military efforts. 
 
The heterogeneity in composition of a population is consistently associated with the 
frequency of wars, military actions and foreign conflict casualties. Countries with many different ethnic groups, language communities, nationality groups and religious and racial 
groups enter wars more often than homogeneous polities. 
 
2.7 Power and war 
 
The importance of direct power relationships as a determinant of international conflict has 
been underlined by some studies. Singer and Small (1970; 1972) have pointed out that major 
powers have been disproportionately involved in wars since 1816. Of the 237 conflicts in 
Dowty’s (1969) study, all but 46 were either between contiguous States, including major 
powers, or were cases of a major power’s expansion into non-contiguous areas (138 in the 
first category, and 53 in the latter). Dowty’s research also tends to bear out the predominance 
among dyadic conflicts of cases in which a substantive quarrel (as opposed to such extraneous 
causes as alliance commitments) divides the conflicting States, and the predominance among 
substantive (“direct”) conflicts of those in which a long-term underlying tension rather than a 
particular issue seems to be at stake. In fact, there is a strong suggestion in this research that 
most of the “overreaching” international conflict systems can be explained as a result of the 
converging strategic dictates of substantive dyadic tensions. In other words, the universal 
strategic imperatives growing out of bilateral conflicts seem to have more explanatory power 
in the four contexts examined than theories which relate conflict behaviour to specific 
structural types of overarching international systems (Dowty, 1969; 1971). Rummel (1964) 
correlated State “power” (in terms of physical size, population size, G.N.P., resources, 
railways, military personnel, total defense expenditures and political centralization) with 
foreign-conflict behaviour, and found a significant link, a result confirmed by Singer (1972) 
and denied by Singer and Small (1970). Various measures of a State’s “values”, the number 
of borders it has, and its military capabilities and armaments, likewise do not indicate a 
propensity in foreign conflict (Rummel, 1968). The question of number of borders was also 
examined by Richardson (1960) for the 33 States he detailed from 1820 to 1945, and he found 
a positive connection between this number and the number of wars where more than 7,000 
people were killed. The discrepant results here, Rummel considers, are due to the greater 
generality of the DON findings, but until the question is further confirmed, he leaves it in 
doubt. 
 
Singer, Bremer and Stuckey (1972) concluded that the concentration of major power 
capabilities exercised an impact on the incidence of war and that its impact has been a 
radically different one in the past and present centuries. 
 
Wallace (1972) found that changes in armed forces levels have a direct - and very powerful - 
effect on international war. In one case, this factor accounts for almost 40 percent of the 
variance. While its effects are not always so large, the only variable besides status incon-
sistency to have a direct effect on war was the mean rate of increase in armed forces. All other 
variables - including, to some degree, status inconsistency itself - affect war only indirectly 
through arms levels. This very important result strongly underlines what Singer has termed 
“the perils of para bellum”: increases in arms levels would appear the key factor in 
transforming the tensions generated by the structure of the international system into a 
tendency toward open belligerency. This would appear to discredit the widely held theory that 
armaments are not of themselves a cause of war, but only reflect the tensions generated by 
other factors which are the true causes. If this were the correct explanation, the relationship 
between armaments and war would have turned out to be spurious, an artifact of the 
relationships between the other explanatory variables and war. Such is very far from the case. Huntington (1966), on the basis of a study of 13 arms races since 1840, challenges the 
conventional idea of an association between arms races and war. Naroll (1969) concludes that 
a defensive stance does not necessarily mean that a nation will engage in fewer wars, whether 
it has superior power or not; in other words, peace-loving nations are just as likely to end up 
fighting. Singer and Small (1972), however, find that relative weakness does tend to lead to 
war, including the case where a nation’s strength is superior but declining. 
 
2.8 Stratification approach 
 
The most systematic efforts to relate power structure to international systems with the extent 
of international violence have been undertaken by Rosecrance (1963), Singer and Small 
(1968) and Haas (1970). 
 
Guided by some elementary notions of general systems theory, Rosecrance established time 
boundaries for nine historical “international systems” between 1740 and 1960, each defined in 
terms of power stratification. With respect to power distribution, the lone unipolar system in 
his sample is fairly stable, but multipolarity is clearly more stable than bipolarity. Considering 
resources either as areas ripe for colonial and imperial expansion or as new states that may be 
targets for ideological or political proselytization, Rosecrance’s codings reveal that the 
availability of unappropriated resources makes for stability; scarcity, for instability. 
Singer and Small (1968) pay closer attention to alliance configuration patterns. Starting with 
the hypothesis that the onset of war is associated with an increase in alliance commitments 
between countries, they assemble an impressive array of data on wars and alliances in order to 
test balance-of-power theory empirically. For the years between 1815 and 1945 they collect 
statistical indicators for each member of the family of nations. Singer and Small slice 
international systems in a manner somewhat similar to Rosecrance, for they analyse four sub-
samples of international systems - a “central system” composed mostly of European countries 
for two eras, 1815-1899 and 1900-1945, and a “total system” of central and peripheral 
countries for the same two eras. 
 
For the 1900-1945 period most correlations are positive, demonstrating that wars have been 
preceded by the formation of many alliances; between 1815 and 1899, in contrast, 
correlations are moderately negative, revealing that alliance involvement must have served as 
a deterrent to the expression of international conflict by military means. 
 
Haas (1970), carving out 21 international subsystems in Europe, Asia and Hawaii, 
intercorrelates 68 variables, half of which pertain to international stratification and the other 
half of which index international violence. Among the 21 subsystems, unipolar power 
distributions are the most peaceful; most members of these systems prefer to engage in war 
outside their home region, if at all. Bipolarity is associated consistently with longer wars, and 
countries seeking to upset an existing distribution of resources are most successful in bipolar 
systems. Major powers in bipolar systems must be content to accept infrequent, localized yet 
prolonged conflicts during cold wars in which there is nibbling at the few ambiguous 
peripheries of superbloc domains. Tripolarity and bipolarity contain the highest rates in 
incidence of war, and most countries in such systems dispatch troops to battlefields. 
In sum: Unipolar and bipolar international arenas are more peaceful than those with tripolarity 
and multipolarity. States are more likely to settle their differences peacefully if they share 
compatibility in main values, a distinctive way of life, mutual responsiveness, a joint core 
area with rising capabilities, expect economic growth, have an unbroken social 
communication network with a wide range of transactions (Haas, 1972).  
2.9 Rank-disequilibrium and war 
 
A prominent contribution to the question of the systemic origins of conflict is the 
“rank-disequilibrium theory” proposed by Merton (1957), Shils (1960) and especially Galtung 
(1964) and developed empirically by East (1972), Midlarsky (1969; 1975); Wallace (1970; 
1972) and Ray (1974). Galtung sees the world system as consisting primarily of nations that 
can be ranked for their comparative status either “T” (topdog) or “U” (underdog) along a 
number of scales - industrialization, for example, income per capita, military power, 
educational level and past glory: “... an interaction system is a multi-dimensional system of 
stratification, where those who have and those who have not, those who have more and those 
who have less, find, are given, or are forced into their positions”. Galtung argues that an 
inter-State system will be unstable if there are high levels of rank-disequilibrium or 
status-discrepancy in it, that is, if too many states are not rank-concordant, but are high on 
some scales but low on others. 
 
Empirical studies have been done along these lines, and Singer (1972), for example, has 
found that the greater the discordant character of State rankings on dimensions of “capability” 
and “diplomatic importance”, the greater will be the systemic propensity to war. 
 
Wallace (1971) has calculated the “achieved” status of a country in terms of its power 
capability (total population, urban population, iron and steel production, number of armed 
forces personnel and military expenditure), and its “ascribed” status in terms of attributed 
diplomatic importance (number of diplomatic missions received by a nation). He has 
determined the status inconsistency scores for each nation for the period 1920-1964, 
aggregated a measure of it for the system as a whole, and tested the relationship between this 
and the amount of war allowing for five-, ten-, and fifteen-year time lags. He has partially 
verified Galtung’s hypothesis, though, as he points out, in a strict sense nothing is explained 
thereby. A significant association was found between status inconsistency in the system and 
the amount of war that occurred ten to fifteen years later. This would suggest that the interna-
tional hierarchy of power capabilities is a factor to be considered, but hardly, one would 
assume, on its own (Pettman, 1975). 
 
In a subsequent study, comprising the period from 1825 to 1964, Wallace (1973) concludes 
“the findings as a whole strongly suggest that the hypothesis linking the amount of status 
inconsistency in the international system to the magnitude and severity of international war 
begun is confirmed”. However, “while the evidence strongly suggest confirmation of the 
hypothesis in the case of inconsistencies between ‘demographic or military’ capability on the 
one hand, and attributed importance on the other, there is little or no confirmation in the case 
of inconsistencies between ‘industrial’ capability and attributed status”. Another important 
conclusion is, 
 
These findings would seem to suggest that influence of status inconsistency on the genesis of 
war has increased over the almost century and a half under study. Moreover, not only the 
magnitude, but also the nature of the relationship varies with the time-period; the later the 
period, the greater the relative importance of inconsistencies involving the urban and 
industrial dimensions of capacity, and the shorter the time lag needed to observe the 
maximum relationship. 
 Turning now to the hypothesis linking differential status mobility in the international system 
with the amount of war begun, we find on the whole far less evidence that would suggest 
confirmation if we examine the direct relationship only. Not only are the bivariate 
correlations generally rather low, but there is very little evidence that the several status 
mobility variables jointly predict well to war, and when one controls for status inconsistency 
the mobility-war relationship appears to be spurious in most cases. (Wallace, 1973) 
 
Confirmation also comes from Midlarsky’s (1975) study: 
 
In the several multivariate analyses of the frequency, duration, and intensity of war in the 
form of battle deaths, the frequency variable was the most strongly predicted by the 
inconsistency variables, and also, in comparison with the other characteristics of war, was 
best explained by the dummy variable interaction analysis. This stands in contrast with the 
lower levels of explanation found for duration and intensity. The gap between ascribed and 
achieved status, the former originating in the system and the latter, a characteristic of nation--
States, is therefore found to be strongly related to the onset of war. 
 
East (1972) takes a much shorter time span: 1946-1964. He applies Weber’s three dimensions 
of “class” (economic position, measured by total G.N.P.), “status” (prestige, measured by 
number of embassies in the State capital) and “power” (politico-military force potential, 
measured by total defence expenditure per year), to determine the extent of status discrepancy 
in the global system and the congruence of State rankings on these three scales. He tested for 
a link between rank discrepancy and international violence (variously measured) with one- -
and two-year time lags, and found a general and consistent pattern that confirmed the 
connection. Even stronger correlations were produced when the data were lagged and time 
lapses allowed for; the most peaceful world, he asserts, will be the most status-concordant 
one. 
These findings, however, could not be confirmed by Ray (1974), who studied war 
involvement and status inconsistency in Europe, 1816-1970. 
 
2.10 Dissimilarity, heterogeneity and war 
 
Dissimilarity of national attributes between two States seems to have had little influence on 
the likelihood of their going to war with each other. Singer (1972) finds that most of the wars 
in the “Correlates of War” project were between nations in close geographical proximity and 
similar on most attribute dimensions. Studying national dyads for 1955-1957, Rummel (1966) 
found only slightly more conflict as attributes of the two nations diverged. Divergence in the 
ethos of the elites of different nations was found by Rosecrance (1963) to be neither a neces-
sary nor a sufficient condition for instability in international systems since 1740. Likewise 
Richardson (1960) found similarity or difference of language of little influence on the 
incidence of war. 
 
Haas (1972) has considered the “heterogeneity” of a State (in ethnic, linguistic, religious, 
racial and national terms) and found it to correlate consistently with frequency of wars, 
military actions, and foreign conflict casualties. Voting support in the United Nations, for 
either the East or West Cold War Bloc, is not associated with foreign conflict, though the 
extent of participation in foreign affairs (in terms of bloc prominence, giving or getting aid, 
and the number of representatives at the United Nations) seems to be correlated in a positive 
way (Haas, 1972). 
 The DON project results include the general observation that: “The more similar two nations 
are in economic development, political orientation, Catholic culture, and density, the more 
aligned their voting in the UN and the less conflictful their interaction will be”. Further: “the 
more dissimilar two nations are in economic development and size and the greater their joint 
technological capability to span geographic distance is, the more overt conflict they have with 
each other”. And finally that: “Racial distance is the most important characteristic 
distinguishing between peace and conflict in international systems” (Rummel, 1969). 
 
Richardson (1960), on the other hand, found little relationship between economic inequality 
and a propensity for war, though the distance between States on the dimensions of language 
and religion did correlate in particular unambiguous ways. 
 
Finally, Russett (1967), after a detailed study of inter-State integration, concludes that : “At 
best, cultural similarity and voting behaviour (in the United Nations) make essentially no 
difference in the probability of conflict... But countries belonging to the same groupings by 
organizational membership, proximity or trade are more than twice as likely to fight than are 
nations which belong to different groups, or to none”. 
 
Richardson (1960) and Luard (1968) both found economic causes of minor importance in the 
wars they surveyed. Richardson also found relative wealth of little value in predicting war, 
but Rummel (1966), in his study of attribute similarities within dyads, found a high 
correlation between conflict and “high economic distance”. Generally, the clustering of States 
into regions does have significance in terms of the likelihood of war, and conflict and 
integration are related, though in a three-step way: when the States involved are mutually 
irrelevant, war is not likely to occur; however, it is likely to be common when “capabilities 
and salience are moderately and narrowly focused”. When capabilities are “numerous and 
varied”, though, war is unlikely again (Russett, 1967). 
 
Rummel (1968) has attempted to correlate the amount of national cooperation (in terms of 
membership of international organizations, treaties, aid and diplomatic representation) and the 
level of a State’s international communications or transactions (in terms of mail, economic aid 
and trade measures) with foreign conflict behaviour, but has found very little connection. 
“Alliances” and foreign conflict have also been examined for covariant effect. Richardson 
(1960) concluded that previous alliance did reduce the likelihood of war between those who 
had been allied, though with many exceptions. Singer and Small (1968) have discovered a 
strong association between the number of alliance bonds which a nation has and the amount 
of war it subsequently experiences in the following years. 
 
2.11 War and international organizations 
 
Singer and Wallace (1970) as well as Rittberger (1971) carried out longitudinal studies of 
international organization-building and its effects on the incidence of international war for the 
periods 1815-1964 and 1865-1965, respectively. Singer and Wallace measured their 
independent variable, international organization-building, by counting and adding all 
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) which existed during any given five-year period 
since 1815; in addition, they constructed two derived measures weighting individual IGOs on 
the basis of membership size and ascribed international status of their members. Rittberger, 
on the other hand, proceeded more selectively and focused on the UN system and its 
predecessor organizations only. 
 In both studies the results of the statistical tests showed unequivocally that, contrary to what 
one would hope, no negative association exists between measures of international 
organization-building and measures of incidence of international war for the time periods 
covered by these investigations. Rather, correlation coefficients are around zero in the case of 
frequency of war and even weakly-to-moderately positive in the cases of magnitude and 
severity of international war. However, further analyses revealed that these positive 
correlations are largely spurious: both the measures of international organization-building and 
the measures of magnitude and severity of international war are themselves positively 
correlated with a third variable, the advance of industrial civilization. This correlation simply 
reflects the growing destructiveness of war as a result of technological progress and its 
diffusion which has been made possible by the advance and spread of industrial civilization 
(Rittberger. 1973). 
 
2.12 The domestic/foreign conflict linkage 
 
Russell and Russell (1968) draw attention to a striking alternating sequence of domestic and 
foreign conflict which is provided by the story of the Plantagenet kings of England: 
 
Henry  III     Civil  war 
Edward  I     Foreign  war 
Edward  II     Civil  war 
Edward  Iil     Foreign  war 
Richard II, Henry IV      Civil war 
Henry  V     Foreign  war 
Henry  VI     Civil  war 
 
They comment: 
 
This particular sequence, and its significance, were not lost on William Shakespeare, who 
made a very careful study of the English chronicles. He presented his findings in the longest 
and most impressive series of historical plays ever written. He saw clearly that the 
alternation was explained by mass direction, promoted by the more energetic rulers, and this 
time he smuggled the message past the censors. In the last act of Henry IV, Part II, he 
expressed in one and a half lines the underlying mechanism of these seven plays. “Be it thy 
course”, says the dying king to his heir Prince Hal, 
 
Be it thy course to busy giddy minds 
With foreign quarrels... 
 
The sequel, in the next play, is the battle of Agincourt - for Henry V took his father’s 
advice. 
 
Considerable work has been done on the characteristics of a national political system and its 
likelihood to engage in domestic or international violence. Some of these studies are based on 
a combination of theoretical analysis and intuitive selected historical evidence. Societies in 
deep crisis, it has been plausibly argued many times (e.g. Lasswell, 1930; Haas, 1968), are 
more likely to elevate psychopathological personalities to key decision-making roles, with 
consequences for their international behaviour. Societies which fail to provide security of 
income and status for large parts of their populations are likely to give rise to extremist 
political movements, and their rulers may then have to choose between letting the increased aggressive attitudes of these groups explode in domestic strife, or assuaging them by rapid 
and far-reaching reforms, or channeling them into international conflict - with theory and 
history suggesting a preference for the third of these responses (Lasswell, 1935). 
 
If this theory of alternative responses to domestic tensions were correct, then foreign conflicts 
would serve as substitutes for domestic ones. According to the “substitution theory”, the 
frequency of the two types of conflict ought to be inversely correlated. Unfortunately, another 
version of the theory predicts the opposite. High degrees of tension ought to create a higher 
demand both for domestic and for international violence. According to this “joint demand 
theory” or “spill-over theory”, the frequency of the two types ought to vary together. Finally, 
a mixed theory would suggest that the effects of substitution and joint demand ought just 
about to balance each other, and that there should be no observable correlation of any kind 
between the frequency of domestic and foreign conflict (Deutsch and Senghaas, 1973). 
 
Several studies have dimensionalized domestic conflict behaviour by factor analysis 
(Rummel, 1963; 1966; Tanter, 1966; Feierabend and Feierabend, 1966; Bwy, 1968; Banks, 
1972; Wilkenfeld, 1969; Gurr, 1968 et seq.). The results distinguish either two or three major 
dimensions of domestic conflict. In all orthogonally rotated factor analyses, a distinct turmoil 
dimension appears which is centred around strikes, riots and demonstrations. Terrorism and 
assassinations load on this factor but also load on the other two factors. The turmoil factor, 
therefore, involves disruptions with rather limited objectives and usually rather limited 
violence, though the violence can easily get out of hand as in the case of some riots. But 
widespread violence is not initially the explicit intent of the perpetrators (Finsterbusch, 1974). 
 
The remaining domestic conflict variables produce either one or two factors. Rummel (1966) 
obtained a “revolution” factor involving coups, mutinies and plots, and a “subversion” factor 
involving civil war and extended violence. The latter is related to large-scale terrorism and 
riots. In Rummel’s (1963) and Banks’ (1972) factor analyses, the highest loading on the 
“revolution” factor is revolutions and on the “subversion” factor is guerrilla warfare. The 
Tanter, Wilkenfeld and Bwy factor analyses combine revolutions and guerilla warfare into a 
single “organized violence” factor and produced no significant third factor. These three 
analyses contained only 7 anti-establishment conflict variables as compared with 12 such 
variables in Rummel’s 1966 analysis and 14 variables in the Feierabends’ analysis. The 
second and third (or the two combined) factors, which we call, following Gurr, “conspiracy” 
and “internal war”, differ from the turmoil factor in terms of the purpose of the perpetrators. 
Turmoil events usually involve public demands by lower groups for relatively specific actions 
on the part of the persons or groups with authority or are relatively goalless spontaneous 
reactions to an accumulation of frustrations. The conspiracy and internal war factors are 
attempts to take over the centres of power. When conspiracy and internal war are 
differentiated, the basis is mainly the scale of operation (Finsterbusch, 1974). 
 
Lee (1931) found that internal violence in China clustered before, during and after external 
wars. Sorokin (1937) carried out a massive, longitudinal analysis of the ancient empires of 
Greece, Rome, Byzantium and a number of European nations over 14 centuries (525-1927). 
Sorokin reported that although there seemed to be a slight indication that internal disturbances 
tend to occur more frequently during and around years of war, upon closer examination the 
two processes tend to be independent of one another. Sorokin’s analysis was based on time 
intervals of quarter centuries and centuries and thus does not yield very discriminant results, 
but rather explores gross trends for major outbreaks of internal and external violence. He states: “So far as century periods are concerned, each process has led a course independent of 
the other without positive or negative association”. 
 
Cattell (1949 et seq.), in a number of attempts aimed at the discovery of culture pattern 
profiles, performed factor analyses on a number of variables representing national 
characteristics from 1837 to 1937. The first two studies (Cattell, 1949; 1950) used 69 nations 
and yielded 12 orthogonally rotated factors. The first two factors contain the variables of 
interest to the present study. The internal and external violence dimensions appear to be 
independent of one another. In a third study  (Cattell, 1951), 29 nations, whose data coverage 
had been considered poor, were dropped from the analysis. The 40 nations that were left were 
chiefly comprised of the “modern industrial nations”. This analysis yielded quite different 
findings. By limiting the sample population, Cattell found that the two processes were not as 
independent as the previous studies had shown, but rather that both tended to load highly on 
the same dimension. 
 
A series of studies, which also utilized factor analysis and, in addition, multiple regression 
techniques, were initiated by Rummel in the Dimensionality of Nations (DON) Project. All 
subsequent research in the linkage between internal and external behaviour of nations has 
relied heavily on the DON project for either methodology and/or data base. The relationship 
between domestic and foreign conflict behaviour in these studies was based on an analysis of 
twenty-two variables for all nations with populations over 800,000 in the years studied. For 
the Rummel data (1955-1957) the sample was 77 nations, while the Tanter data (1958-1960), 
as a result of population growth and the inclusion of newly independent nations, included a 
universe of 83 (Stohl, 1976). 
 
The first Rummel (1963) and Tanter (1964) studies found a slightly positive association 
between domestic conflict behaviour and the more belligerent forms of foreign conflict 
behaviour, although for the most part, the independence of the two were reconfirmed. 
Subsequently, the 1955-1957 data were annually reanalysed by Chadwick (1963) and, with 
one-year time lag, this independence was further supported. Tanter (1966) lagged the 
1958-1960 data on the 1955-1957 data and found that there was a slight increase in the 
relationship. He suggested that: “There may be no simple relationship between domestic and 
foreign conflict behaviour, but there may be a causal relationship which is being obscured by 
other phenomena”. The studies also identified separate independent dimensions within both 
the internal and external dimensions themselves. Rummel (1963) states: “The domestic 
conflict behaviour of nations varies along three uncorrelated dimensions: turmoil, 
revolutionary and subversive. The foreign conflict behaviour of nations varies along three 
uncorrelated dimensions: war, diplomatic and belligerent”. 
 
Tanter (1964) found that the revolutionary and subversive dimensions were subsumed under 
one internal war dimension, while the turmoil dimension and the foreign conflict behaviour 
dimensions compared favorably with the Rummel study. The early DON project data base did 
not include the majority of African nations, since they were not independent in 1955. Collins 
(1969), employing the same general research strategy put forth by Rummel and his 
successors, investigated the relationship between foreign conflict behaviour and domestic dis-
order in Africa in the period 1963-1965. In this study, the first to investigate the relationship 
within one “region”, Collins reports that there were differences between his results and the 
preceding work: “Foreign violence is related to conditions of domestic disorder more so in 
African States than elsewhere, although the size of the correlations indicates that foreign violence is a product of other factors as well, which have not been tapped in the present 
research”. 
Using Richardson’s (1960) data over the 1820-1949 period, Denton (1966) described a 
relationship between a civil conflict dimension and inter-nation conflict with peaks in the 
former preceding peaks in the latter, and Denton and Phillips (1968) used Q. Wright’s (1942; 
1965) data for 1480-1900 to arrive at a correlation of .39 between percentage of civil wars 
and an index of international violence (Dowty and Kochan, 1974). 
 
Haas (1965; 1968) confirmed the low correlations between foreign conflict and both 
legitimate domestic conflict and illegitimate domestic conflict (revolution, guerrilla), and in a 
smaller sample of 10 nations from 1900 to 1960 found little support for linking “use of 
military means” to “internal stresses”, but he also uncovered a very high connection between 
foreign conflict and anomic domestic conflict (riots). 
 
Feierabend and Feierabend (1966) and North and Choucri (1969) reported strong positive 
relationships between internal tensions or frustrations and external aggressiveness. 
Also Weede (1975) found domestic and international conflicts closely related in the fifties 
and sixties of the twentieth century. However, he  concludes that it is false that domestically 
unstable nations tend to be aggressive against other nations. Instead, they become victims of 
superpower intervention. 
 
Haas (1965) finds more foreign conflict in “non-constitutiona1” governments, a claim 
supported very indirectly, according to Dowty and Kochan (1974), by Kaplan’s (1968) 
observation that in three historic international systems studied, the threat to stability always 
came from the “sub-system dominant, directive” actors, and by Naroll’s (1969) conclusion 
from his broad historical survey that States with greater centralization tend to be involved in 
more wars. 
 
There seems to be at least equal evidence, however, against a connection between warlikeness 
and type of regime. Richardson (1960) argues that no States in his survey can be properly 
characterized as inherently belligerent or pacific, and Luard’s (1968) survey of 62 wars in the 
1865-1965 period also offers “little evidence” of such a connection. On a broader level, Haas’ 
(1972) study of the linkage between warlike behaviour and some 200 societal characteristics 
concludes that there is little support for any of the classic theories on such linkage. 
 
Most important of these contra-indications is Wilkenfeld’s (1968 et seq.) study of the 
hypothetical link between the nature of a State’s political system and its foreign-conflict 
behaviour, including war. Rummel and Tanter did not differentiate between the States they 
used, and may have concealed thereby positive connections that run against their results. 
Working with 74 states, Wilkenfeld divided them into three factored groups-politically 
“personalist” (Latin American dictatorships for example), “centrist” (socialist and Middle 
Eastern regimes) and “polyarchic” (economically developed, Western and westernized) - and 
correlations were then carried out using these groups for all the possible pairs of foreign and 
domestic conflict dimensions that Rummel identified. Correlational tests were made using 
zero time lags and lags of one year and two. In the “personalist” group internal conflict was 
accompanied by foreign conflict of the “diplomatic” sort (diplomatic expulsions and troop 
movements). Using a two-year time lag a significant association was discernible between the 
“turmoil” dimension (demonstrations, riots, government crises) and external “belligerency”. 
Most interesting of all, however, was the occurrence of “war” and the apparent outbreak two 
years later of the subversive domestic activities of assassination and guerrilla revolt. This link Rummel’s (1964) study, in its generalized, perhaps overgeneralized way, explicitly denied.  
For the “centrist” group domestic “revolutionary” activity (purges, general strikes, revolutions 
and numbers killed within the State) was followed in one or two years by all the 13 types of 
foreign-conflict behaviour. Wilkenfeld’s results here might support the traditional argument 
that foreign conflict is used by State elites to distract from domestic disorder. Finally, 
“polyarchic” States experiencing “turmoil” (anti-government demonstrations, riots and major 
government crises) engage in all types of foreign-conflict behaviour, and vice versa. The 
relationship is a mutually reinforcing one, which likewise supports the traditional view. 
Wilkenfeld’s earlier results are further supported by those of Zinnes and Wilkenfeld (1971): 
the governmental structure of a State is important in predicting the relationships between 
foreign and domestic conflict behaviour. 
 
Another finding, also generally consistent with Wilkenfeld’s earlier study, is that some 
relationship exists between domestic conflict behaviour and foreign conflict behaviour. The 
relationship, however, is  very specific. Internal warfare affects the transitions in the level of 
belligerency only for polyarchic States, while turmoil affects the transitions in the levels of 
belligerency only for centrist States. Again, there appears to be no relationship between 
domestic conflict behaviour and foreign conflict behaviour for personalist States. 
 
A final result that emerged from the analyses was the effect of very extensive domestic 
conflict on international conflict behaviour. It was generally found that high levels of 
domestic conflict tended to be associated with a subsequent reduction in the level of 
international conflict commitments (Zinnes and Wilkenfeld, 1971). 
 
In a third study Wilkenfeld and Zinnes (1973) employed Markov analysis to determine if 
foreign conflict behaviour affects the changes or transitions over time between levels of 
domestic conflict behaviour. Once again the Rummel and Tanter data were utilized and the 
factor scores were the data for the Markov analysis. When all nations were analysed “the 
foreign conflict behaviour war” was measured by the variables most highly loading on this 
factor (military actions, wars, mobilizations and foreign killed) affects transitions in domestic 
conflict behaviour as captured by the turmoil factor (strikes, riots, demonstrations) primarily 
when domestic conflict behaviour is at a very high level” (Wilkenfeld and Zinnes, 1973). 
When the nations were analysed by nation type it was again found that foreign conflict 
behaviour primarily affects transitions in domestic conflict for the personalist and polyarchic 
States. 
 
Stohl (1971) reanalysed the Rummel (1963) data after dividing the nations into groups by 
political type corresponding once again to the Banks and Gregg study. Supporting 
Wilkenfeld’s conclusion, political type of nation was found to play an important role in 
determining the conflict patterns within and between nations. The factor analysis of the 
measures of conflict behaviour found that there were different patterns of domestic and 
foreign conflict behaviour for each of the political types. Further exploration of the 
relationship, through multiple regression analysis with a one-year time lag, revealed 
moderately strong relationships in polyarchies, between diplomatic exchanges and general 
internal strife (r = .54), and between war and internal crises (r = .45). In the personalist 
nations increases in foreign conflict behaviour were associated with small increases in 
domestic conflict behaviour (multiple R’s - .25, .45, .33, .40); while in the centrist cluster, 
there was no relationship discovered. It was hypothesized that the two major factors dif-
ferentiating the three groups, level of social control and decision latitude, could account for 
the differences. As degree of social control and decision latitude decreases, elites are faced with greater pressure to justify their foreign conflict behaviour to their populations. It was 
suggested that higher information levels and inadequate elite justifications of behaviour may 
help to explain the higher associations between foreign and domestic conflict behaviour found 
in polyarchies and personalist nations (Stohl, 1976). 
 
Stohl (1973; 1974; 1975) attacks the linkage problem via another route. Using a 
quasi-experimental design, he has looked for the effects of American war involvement on 
domestic levels of political violence. His results are mixed; there is no uniform pattern that 
holds both for each of the five wars (from the Spanish-American War to the Viet Nam War) 
and for each of the different dimensions of violence. 
 
Two more recently reported studies of the relationship have attempted a more sophisticated 
analysis through the use of canonical analysis. Canonical analysis attempts to maximize the 
linear correlation between  sets of variables. Phillips (1970), in a study of the impact of the 
conflict environment of nations via a regression analysis of the residuals in the canonical 
analysis of the DON data for 1963, found evidence for a relationship between internal and 
external violence. He states: 
 
The conclusion here is that nations displaying domestic violence, having a low percentage of 
population in agriculture, who have tended to experience unlawful changes of offices in the 
recent past, and have a high cost-of-living index, tend to send more military violence to the 
environment than would be expected, given normal exchange with the environment. In other 
words, modernizing nations experiencing inflation and internal violence possibly associated 
with unlawful change of leadership, are likely to respond militarily to their environment. 
 
It should be noted that these types of states more closely resemble the personalist type 
differentiated by Wilkenfeld and Stohl and the African States studied by Collins, lending 
support to those findings (Stohl, 1976). 
 
The most ambitious use of the Rummel and Tanter data to date has been the attempt by 
Hazlewood (1973) to adapt this data for use within a general systems model. Hazlewood’s 
main hypothesis concerning this chapter’s interest was that “to the extent that internal variety 
is more extensive than internal constraint, the system stresses are likely to be manifested in 
foreign conflict behaviour at a later time period”. 
 
Employing the Tanter and Rummel foreign conflict behaviour factors and subsequent 
canonical and path analysis, Hazlewood found that: “Existing internal variety (societal 
diversity and turmoil), even without extreme economic expansion to activate it, is strongly 
associated with external conflict behaviour. Economic stability, societal heterogeneity and 
internal turmoil predict best to war”. However, the path analysis revealed that, “The strongest 
path in the model relates turmoil to war for 1958-1960 through prior warfare”. This would 
indicate that past foreign conflict behaviour is more robust than domestic conflict in 
predicting war. 
 
Kegley, Richardson and Richter (1978) isolated for further study the size and importance of 
the military as a coercive resource of a State. They thus focus upon Hazlewood’s finding that 
relatively highly militarized States experiencing domestic turmoil are disinclined to engage in 
foreign conflict. The correlation of their militarization measure with internal conflict is .15 
and with foreign conflict .24. These results indicate that the militarization variable is at most 
only modestly correlated with either sphere of conflict. Thus, the coefficients fall somewhere between the contradictory results of, first, Haas (1974) and Rummel (1968), the latter 
concluding that “the military capabilities of a nation have little relationship to its foreign 
conflict behaviour”, and, more recently, Choucri and North (1975) who discovered instead a 
strong correlation between the same two factors. 
 
Overall, the impression one gets from the evidence is that military armament levels tend 
slightly to co-vary with the incidence of foreign conflict, but that military preparedness is not 
a very reliable predictor of external hostility. Suffice it to suggest here that militarization 
appears to predict potently to neither foreign nor domestic conflict in a direct fashion. 
The empirical question Kegley, Richardson and Richter (1978) finally raise is, “What 
happens to the domestic-foreign conflict linkage when we take into consideration government 
types as measured by differences in level of military spending?”. Here the 73 countries of 
their sample are divided into three subsets according to the levels of their military 
expenditures: low, medium and high; and the bivariate correlation between domestic and 
foreign conRict is computed separately for each of the three groups of countries. These 
coefficients are revealing. 
 
The 39 polities comprising the “low” militarization category show a very small positive 
relationship between their domestic and foreign conflict behaviour, whereas those in the 
“medium” militarization group manifest virtually no relationship whatsoever between their 
domestic and foreign conflict propensities. To recapitulate, the bulk of the nations comprising 
the international system show moderate or low levels of military spending. And, for this large 
majority, internal strife does not appear to serve as a stimulus to or catalyst for foreign 
conflict. The picture quickly changes, however, when we turn to the highly militarized 
societies. For these 10 countries (14 percent of the population under investigation), the 
relationship between domestic and foreign conflict behaviour is inverse (r = -.49), and this 
association is significant at the .07 level, corroborating Hazlewood’s determination. This 
evidence tells us that in militarized countries, the higher the level of civil strife, the lower the 
level of external conflict and, conversely, that militarized nations experiencing low levels of 
domestic turmoil tend to be more conflictual in the behaviour they direct toward foreign 
targets. Moreover, the finding informs us more broadly that only in highly militarized 
societies does a patterned relationship between civil strife and foreign conflict exist. 
 
In sum: when countries are grouped according to their relative efforts to militarize, civil strife 
is negatively related to (later) foreign conflict in the most militarized societies, consistent with 
Hazlewood’s inquiry into governmental responses to domestic stress (Kegley, Richardson and 
Richter, 1978). 
 
Sloan (1978) studied dyadic linkage politics in Lebanon, and concluded: 
 
There is a strong relationship between domestic conflict and conflict directed towards 
external supporters for the dissident elements in a national conflict, especially if the 
possibility of national `disintegration’, though not necessarily the disappearance of the 
nation as a political entity, exists. It is the direct threat to the political fabric of the State, 
and not a physical threat to the continued existence of the nation, that results in a strong 
correlational linkage between domestic conflict levels and dyadic external conflict. 
 
The nature or state of a country’s economy has also been tested for the difference in the way 
it and foreign-conflict behaviour concur. Rummel (1968) finds no correlation between the 
two, measuring the economic development dimension in terms of telephones per capita, G.N.P. per capita, energy consumption per capita and percentage of the population engaged in 
agriculture. He cites other studies that corroborate this conclusion. 
 
Zinnes (1972), however, in reviewing Rummel’s empirical results, notes a set of positive 
correlations within them that would seem to indicate that the more developed countries 
(measured by their G.N.P., rate of population increase, number of calories consumed in 
relation to the number nutritionally required, steel production and electricity generated) 
engage in more foreign-conflict behaviour, particularly of the protest, expulsion of lesser 
diplomatic personnel and troop movement sorts. Haas (1965), too, has found that “the most, 
and, to a lesser extent, the least developed countries, which one might expect to have a high 
degree of economic stability, exhibit more significant foreign conflict than do the 
underdeveloped and intermediate types”. 
 
Retesting this result, using U.N. data to estimate national wealth, Haas (1965) has confirmed 
that rich States have more foreign conflict than most developing countries. In a later study 
(Haas, 1968), however, he draws the opposite conclusion: “rural international systems”, he 
says, “are more peaceful than transitional industrial international systems... [but as] 
industrialization proceeds, war is less necessary for solving internal problems”. Here, 
however, indices of social “stress” and “strain” have intervened. 
 
Haas (1965) in particular has developed a set of domestic measures in these terms, and looked 
for foreign-conflict correlations with them. In terms of “stress”, he tested a limited sample of 
ten countries for the years from 1900 to 1960 and found a positive connection between 
“unemployment” and the frequency of war. Rural countries differed markedly from States 
with large urban populations in this regard, though the sample itself was loaded with 
industrialized nations. 
 
Lacking an industrial base for prolonged or total war, rural states are much more aggressive in 
entering war as an immediate escape from sudden stress than are urban countries. 
Nevertheless, rural nations are so often isolationist... that they respond to few of their 
economic crises in a violent external manner. Urban countries are less immediately 
aggressive, but many of them find it convenient to eliminate the unemployment problem. And 
the effect of militarization by several countries has been to feed fears and suspicions of other 
States, thus triggering fateful arms races (Haas, 1965). 
 
That stress and strain in a societal system might spill over into State behaviour on the 
international level is consistent with the evidence presented by Haas (1968) based on the 
analysis of 10 countries for the 1900-1960 period. He presents a theory of coping mechanisms 
linked to a continuum from rural to urban societies. A completely rural society is called Type 
I; a totally urban society is Type V; these are ideal constructs. Intermediate positions are 
Types II, III and IV. Forms of deviance, using Parsons’ (1959) scheme, can be associated 
with each point on the continuum. Because revolutions and homicides are associated with 
rural settings, and suicides and alcoholism most prevalent in urban milieus, active orientations 
are located towards the rural end, passivity towards the urban end. In Type V, it is postulated 
that stress is eliminated before it is strainful, so conformity is its model orientation. This 
pattern is presented in table 8. 
 
 
         TABLE 8 
       Distance and the rural-urban continuum  
Types  of  Deviant  Main   Main 
Societies  Orientations     Deviant  Types of 
       (Parsons)   Acts   Wars   Examples 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
I.  Rural-  Active-Person   Homicides  Outlet   Nomadic  Tribes 
Agricultural Focused 
 
II. Rural  Active-Norm    Homicides  Outlet    Finland 1900-1960 
and Semi-  Focused    Suicides  Disunity  Japan 1900-1945 
Industrial         Norway  1900-1918 
              Spain  1900-1960 
III. Mixed  Passive-Norm   Alcoholism  Arms Race  Australia 1900-1960 
Rural-Urban  Focused   Suicides    France  1900-1960 
              Germany  1900-1918 
              Japan  1946-1960 
              Norway  1919-1960 
              Switzerland  1900-1945 
              U.S.A.  1900-1918 
 
IV. Mostly  Passive-Person  Suicides  Arms Race  Germany 1919-1960 
Urban-   Focused     Deterrence  U.K.  1900-1960 
Industrial         Switzerland  1946-1960 
              U.S.A.  1919-1960 
 
V.  Fully  None    None   Deterrence  Orwell’s  1984 
Urban-   (conformity)   (conformity) 
Industrial 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
The next problem is to fit coping mechanisms into the picture. “Outlet” wars are related to 
lack of mechanisms in rural and semi-industrial countries for handling stress directly; “arms 
race” wars are associated with the use of militarization as a means of dealing with economic 
crisis in the mixed societies; “deterrence” involves mostly urban industrial States. 
Accordingly, it may be argued that there are at least 5 distinct causal chains linking stress 
conditions with the use of military means of international conflict resolution, one 
corresponding to each type. An extended examination of the process of coping with stress is 
also presented by Haas (1968). 
 
If societies and economies become very complex, a recent study has demonstrated according 
to Haas (1968), suicide, homicide and compulsive alcoholism are less socially available, but 
deaths due to ulcers and hypertension increase. Rudin (1963) found that the “need for power” 
is related to violent-demonstrative death rates (rho = .41) and the “need for achievement” 
correlates (rho = .66) with deaths due to inhibition and repression. 
 
2.13 Population and war 
 In the Cattell (1949) study, population density has a +.32 score on the ‘Cultural Pressure’ 
factor, and urbanization has a +.78 loading; war participation had a +.62 position. In other 
words, war, population density and urbanism are highly intercorrelated with the dimension of 
societal stress. Logically war could not of itself breed high population density or urbanization, 
so one might infer that urban population density is one antecedent to wars. 
 
Haas (1965) used the “Cross-Polity Survey” (Banks and Textor, 1963) to test this hypothesis. 
He concludes that: “the stress within overcrowded cities bears more relation to international 
conflict than the stresses associated with life in densely settled farmlands” (Haas, 1965). 
 
In support here we might include Rummel’s (1964) findings that demographic variables 
(population density, birth rate, infant mortality and rate of population increases) were the 
most important predictors of conflict within and between States. Instead of the expected 
correlation between the degree of foreign conflict and population density, Haas (1965) finds 
“a slight inverse relation” in his study of societal variables contributing to foreign conflict 
behaviour of nation-States. Finding no relationship between the rapid increase of world 
population from 1820 and 1949 and any proportionate increase in the frequency of, and losses 
from, war, Richardson (1960) concluded: “There is a suggestion, but not a conclusive proof, 
that mankind has become less warlike since A.D. 1820”. 
 
Singer (1972) too finds “no significant association between a nation’s growth rate in 
population or density and its war-proneness” in his study of 93 international wars during the 
period 1816-1965. 
 
There is no definite evidence that overpopulation or density per se leads to war. Empirical 
correlations are generally spurious and do not hold cross-culturally. Many densely populated 
areas in the world have been highly stable, and many States in Latin America and Africa with 
low population densities have been highly unstable (Weiner, 1971). However, the search for 
raw materials and markets has often been a prominent cause of international conflict. The 
interactive effects of the population growth, technological development and resource 
constraints have been traditionally associated with the extension of national activities outside 
of legal boundaries and with the ensuing competition for resource and territorial control. For 
example, nineteenth-century colonial expansion was accompanied by considerable population 
growth in Europe in combination with increases in economic productivity and technological 
capabilities (Weiner, 1971). 
 
In a simulation model of international conflict Choucri et al. (1971) have shown that 
population growth, economic and technological development, resource utilization, national 
expansion and international behaviour are intensely interdependent and linked with 
requirements for basic resources. 
 
Choucri and Bennett (1972) and Choucri and North (1972) use population figures as part of a 
more general equation that leads in a general way to foreign conflict and war. In this equation, 
however, there are at least two important intervening variables - the contemporary demand for 
resources, and the level of technology. An increase in population must bring about increased 
demands for resources and a greater level of technological development before “lateral 
pressures”, competition and crisis are likely to lead to violent conflict. 
In her monograph “Population Dynamics and International Violence”, the most extensive 
quantitative analysis available to date, Choucri (1974) presents the following conclusions: 
 The qualitative evidence from Part I and the more systematic evidence from Part II both 
strongly suggest that population factors indeed have a pronounced effect upon the 
development of conflict situations, and can often be critical determinants of violence and 
warfare. But the linkages between population and violence are rarely direct: complex 
intervening networks are at work. Major wars, as well as local conflicts, often emerge by 
way of a two-step process: First, in terms of internally generated pressures and demands 
occasioned by growing needs associated with added population: and then in terms of 
reciprocal comparisons, rivalries and conflict for control over resources, territory, valued 
goods or spheres of influence. Each step is closely related to the other, and each can be 
traced to the interaction among the population, resource and technological attributes of a 
society. In those terms, population factors amount to critical determinants of violent 
conflict. 
 
Furthermore: 
 
There is no evidence to suggest that density by itself emerges as an important determinant 
of conflict and violence. Far more critical appears to be the location and distribution of 
population in relation to resources (as distinct from pressures upon resources) and location 
in relation to national borders. In the developing world, at least, these two factors emerge as 
critical in conflict situations. The location of population and its distribution in relation to 
resource may often exacerbate tensions between the resource-rich and resource-poor areas, 
making the task of developing a viable political community considerably more difficult. 
 
2.14 In summary 
 
Vasquez (1976) presented a synoptic inventory of null, promising and possible statistical 
findings. Among these the following are pertinent: 
 
•  There appears to be no strong relationship between the economic, social-cultural, 
political, health, geographical, communication, or educational characteristics of 
nations and violence between nations. 
•  There appears to be no strong relationship between the amount of internal stress 
within nations and violence between nations. 
•  There appear to be no strong relationships among the demographic--
economic-geographical characteristics of nations, the level of internal stress within 
nations and violence between nations. 
•  There appear to be no strong relationships among the political characteristics of 
nations, the amount of internal stress within nations and violence between nations. 
•  There appears to be no strong relationship between the level of dependence of nations 
and violence between nations. 
•  There appears to be no strong relationship between inter-nation alliances and violence 
between nations. 
•  There appear to be no strong relationships among the military power of nations, 
inter-nation alliances and violence between nations. 
•  There appears to be no strong relationship between the isolationism/ participation of 
nations and violence between nations. 
•  There appears to be no strong relationship between the perceptions of national and 
non-national decision-makers and violence among nations and other actors. •  There appears to be no strong relationship between violence among nations and peace 
overtures among nations. 
 
Vasquez comments: “the notion that the national attributes of a nation or internal stress within 
a nation may be related to international conflict is not supported. The notion that alliances or 
the balance of power are related to conflict or violence is not supported. The belief that 
transactions lead to peace is not supported”. 
 
•  There may be a strong relationship between the demographic characteristics of nations 
and violence between nations. 
•  There may be a strong relationship between the military power and status of nations 
and violence between nations. 
•  There could be strong relationships among the demographic-economic characteristics 
of nations, the military power of nations, inter-nation alliances and violence between 
nations. 
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